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IN DEFENSE OF GHOSTWRITING
Jona Goldschmidt*
INTRODUCTION
The increased presence of pro se litigants in the court has re-
sulted in more interest in their plight and the challenges it poses for
court administration.' The growth of pro se litigation is a sign of
the times. It can be attributed to the high cost of litigation, anti-
lawyer sentiment, and the advent of do-it-yourself law kits, books,
and web sites. Increased literacy has certainly contributed to the
increase in pro se litigation. Less appreciated is the increase in
computer literacy. As educated people of modest means become
computer literate, they increasingly take advantage of court web
sites that make forms available, clinics that provide instruction on
proceeding pro se, and pro se self-service centers.
This segment of the pro se population still needs legal assistance
to make sure their legal papers are in order and to navigate the
litigation process. They need more legal assistance than court staff
or a pro se clinic instructor can provide. Many prospective pro se
litigants seek assistance from either non-lawyer practitioners
(whose practices are generally limited to filling in legal forms) or
lawyers willing to provide "unbundled" legal services, such as re-
viewing client-drafted pleadings or ghostwriting papers that will be
signed by the client and filed pro se.
This article analyzes the legal community's resistance to ghost-
writing for pro se litigants. Part I examines the nature, extent, and
benefits of ghostwriting. Part II analyzes objections to ghost-
writing raised in case law and ethics opinions. Part III describes
* Jona Goldschimdt is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Jus-
tice at Loyola University Chicago. He received his Ph.D. from Arizona State Univer-
sity and his J.D. from DePaul University College of Law.
1. This interest can be viewed as part of the larger history of court reform, a
history that includes the advent of legal services, merit selection, and specialized
courts like small claims courts. The national movement towards court reform is re-
flected in the streamlining of pleading and procedure rules, the adoption of unified
court systems, the establishment of racial!gender equality task forces, and the devel-
opment of user-friendly courts. These developments have all aimed at increasing the
quality of legal services and enhancing access to justice. The scarcity of legal services
for the poor and the growing numbers of people unable to afford legal services has
also led to other access-enhancing developments. These include the bar's increased
promotion of pro bono services and the emergence of a growing number of en-
trepreneurial non-lawyer practitioners and document-preparation services.
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recent ghostwriting recommendations and regulatory develop-
ments. Part IV discusses the relevance of the duty of confidential-
ity and the attorney-client privilege to ghostwriting. Part V
analyses the legal community's resistance to ghostwriting-placing
it in the context of the legal profession, the adversary system, and
resistance to other court reforms. The article concludes that ghost-
writing serves a growing segment of the pro se population. The
practice does not violate court rules or ethical principles, and does
not threaten the courts' institutional interests. Indeed, the rules of
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege support ghost-
writing by protecting the identity of counsel against compelled
disclosure.
1. NATURE, EXTENT, AND BENEFITS OF GHOSTWRITING
Limited, or unbundled services representation is an alternative
to traditional full-service representation. Instead of entering a no-
tice of appearance and representing the client in all aspects of the
case, the lawyer only provides limited or discrete services. Typi-
cally, the client pays for the service at the time it is rendered rather
than paying a lump sum retainer or being billed on a monthly basis.
According to Forrest Mosten, the father of unbundled legal ser-
vices,2 limited representation can include advising the client, re-
searching the law, drafting documents, and representing the client
in court.3 Limited services representation costs less and allows cli-
ents to stay in control of their cases.
Unbundled legal services have always been available in transac-
tional practice, but they are a new development in family law and
civil litigation. One study reported a high degree of client satisfac-
tion from unbundled legal services.4
Mosten especially promotes unbundled services in family law
cases:
2. Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundled Legal Services and Unrepresented Family Court
Litigants: Current Developments and Future Trends, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 15 n.1 (2002).
3. See generally FORREST S. MOSTEN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO MEDIATION 10-
11 (1997); Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28
FAM. L.Q. 421, 423-24 (1994); Mosten's Model for Unbundling, Wis. LAW., Sept. 1997,
http://www.wisbar.org (listing seventeen categories of services to choose from in an
unbundling arrangement).
4. See The Maryland Experiment, Wis. LAW., Sept. 1997, http://www.wisbar.org
(describing a seventeen-month experiment at the University of Maryland Clinical
Law Program, in which clients rated their satisfaction from 8.1 to 8.8 on a 10-point
scale).
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Often a party whose spouse has filed for a divorce simply needs
to file an Answer .... Then the party will be able to negotiate
with his or her spouse or the spouse's lawyer to resolve the is-
sues of the case. Occasionally, the party may need more com-
plex documents filed, such as Interrogatories, Requests for the
Production of Documents, Requests for Admissions, and Mo-
tions. In each case, the party may desire to maintain control of
their case but need the assistance of a lawyer to file the docu-
ment properly. An attorney who offers unbundled legal services
can help draft documents that the party can file. This way, the
document will meet the court's standards, the party will protect
legal rights, and the party can continue to negotiate without hav-
ing to work through a lawyer.5
According to Mosten, "Many self-representers can afford law-
yers but do not want to use them because they do not want to
spend the money, are afraid of losing control over their own lives,
or believe that lawyers would actually add to their problems."6
No one has systematically collected data on the frequency of
ghost writing but judging by the articles, conferences, cases, and
ethics opinions on the subject, it appears to have taken hold of the
legal community, if not the pro se population itself.
II. ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIONS TO GHOSTWRITING
In the few cases that address ghostwriting, courts often conclude
that the practice violates ethical responsibilities, rule requirements,
obligations to opposing parties, duties of attorneys as court of-
ficers, and principles of fairness. Indeed, ghostwriting is often con-
sidered contemptuous or otherwise sanctionable conduct.7 The
courts have thrown the book at ghostwriters, and the practice has
therefore been chilled. This section addresses the dominant ratio-
nales for opposing ghostwriting.
5. Forrest Mosten & Lee Borden, Unbundled Legal Services, at http://www.
zorza.net (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
6. See Forrest S. Mosten, Mediation and the Process of Family Law Reform, 37
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 429, 441 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.
Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997). This opinion and others discussed refer to the du-
ties of attorneys, as officers of the court, to be candid and honest with tribunals, and
conclude that ghostwriting violates Rule 11, puts the opposing party at unfair disad-
vantage, and "interferes with the efficient administration of justice." Id.
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A. The Undue Advantage Argument
A review of the case law indicates that the primary objection to
ghostwriting is that it gives pro se litigants an undue advantage
over their represented adversaries. In Johnson v. Board of County
Commissioners,' the most oft-cited case, the pro se defendant was
a former county sheriff sued for sexual harassment and civil rights
violations. The Johnson court indicated its displeasure with the
fact that an attorney ghostwrote the defendant's motions for an
extension of time while he sought counsel to represent him.9 Not-
ing that ghostwriting was "arising with increasing frequency,"'" the
court gave the undue advantage rationale for prohibiting ghost-
written filings:
It is elementary that pleadings filed pro se are to be interpreted
liberally. [The defendant's] pleadings seemingly filed pro se but
drafted by an attorney would give him the unwarranted advan-
tage of having a liberal pleading standard applied whilst holding
the plaintiffs to a more demanding scrutiny. Moreover, such un-
disclosed participation by a lawyer that permits a litigant falsely
to appear as being without professional assistance would perme-
ate the proceedings. The pro se litigant would be granted
greater latitude as a matter of judicial discretion in hearings and
trials. The entire process would be skewed to the distinct disad-
vantage of the nonoffending party.1
The Johnson court cited no specific harm or actual undue advan-
tage that resulted from the filing of the ghostwritten papers. Nev-
ertheless, according to the court,
having a litigant appear to be pro se, when in truth an attorney is
authoring pleadings and necessarily guiding the course of the lit-
igation with an unseen hand is ingenuous to say the least; it is far
below the level of candor which must be met by members of the
bar.12
8. Johnson v. Bd. of County Commr's, 868 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994), affd on
other grounds, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996).
9. Id. at 1229-32.
10. Id. at 1227.
11. Id. at 1231 (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 1232.
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The "unseen hand"'13 language in Johnson and other terms demon-
izing the ghostwriting attorney 14 are found in most cases on the
subject.15
The unfair advantage argument assumes that since pro se liti-
gants are ill-equipped to prosecute their claims because full repre-
sentation is unavailable or undesired, there is no reason to provide
them with any legal services. Such a sweeping generalization may
be true for some complex actions that no lay litigant could prose-
cute. But, in garden-variety civil and family cases, many persons of
ordinary intelligence can navigate the system with forms and pro se
assistance programs provided by state courts. Since the level of
court users' general and computer literacy is rising, and since, in-
creasing numbers of litigants are taking advantage of this assis-
tance, federal courts may soon adopt similar programs.
The Johnson court cited three cases to support its ruling that
ghostwritten papers are improper. One of them, Klein v. Spear,
Leeds & Kellogg'6 (Klein I), was perhaps the earliest anti-ghost-
writing case. Klein I involved a pro se plaintiff whom the court
described as "an habitual litigant who in the past five or six years
[had] commenced well over thirty lawsuits against a very large
number of defendants."' 7 The court's description of ghostwriting
was condemnatory:
An unverified statement brought to our attention is to the effect
that an attorney (or attorneys) have been and still are, actively
assisting [the plaintiff] with legal advice . . . by drawing up the
papers before us now as well as those submitted on the prior
motion. They are quite voluminous and by reason of their legal
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1230-32 (describing ghostwriting attorney as a "Phantom" or an "undis-
closed counsel").
15. An exception is Olvera v. Edmundson, No. 1:01cv74-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13169, at *1 (W.D.N.C. June 15, 2001). The court did not find ghostwriting improper,
perhaps because there was no motion made to hold the pro se plaintiff in contempt or
to compel her to disclose the fact and identity of her ghostwriter. Id. Rather than
demonizing the ghostwriting attorney, the court characterized the ghostwriting as not
furthering the judicial process and evidencing inadequate business sense or the ability
to properly evaluate the merits of the clients' cases. The court held that
Review of the pro se complaint reveals that it likely was drafted by a lawyer
who has not made an appearance. While not an unethical practice, the court
notes that ghostwriting does little for the judicial process, inasmuch as pro se
litigants are ill equipped to prosecute the complex issues raised without con-
tinued legal assistance.
Id. at *2 n.1.
16. Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
17. Id. at 342.
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content and phraseology most strongly suggest that they ema-
nate from a legal mind. If this be true, it should not be counte-
nanced. It is one thing to give some free legal advice
(incidentally, plaintiff is apparently not indigent); quite another
to participate so extensively and not reveal one's identity. If this
is the case, we see no good or sufficient reason for depriving the
opposition and the Court of the identity of the legal representa-
tives involved so that we can proceed properly and with the rela-
tive assistance that comes from dealing in the open. Besides,
where it is unnecessary we should not be asked to add the extra
strain to our labours in order to make certain that the pro se
party is fully protected in his rights. Most importantly, this un-
revealed support in the background enables an attorney to
launch an attack against another member of the Bar (as was
done by this same plaintiff), without showing his face. This
smacks of the gross unfairness that characterizes hit-and-run
tactics. If this is the situation here, we vigorously condemn it.' 8
The foregoing comments are noteworthy for several reasons.
First, the court was not dealing with the typical pro se litigant of
today, most often found in family court. Rather, the court was con-
fronting a rarer kind of pro se plaintiff-the kind many judges have
in mind when discussing pro se litigants-a "pest," a "nut," or a
"kook."' 9 It appears that the court's concern about ghostwriting
resulted from defense counsel's complaint.2 0 This led the court to
argue that undisclosed ghostwriting created-in some unstated
way-an unfair advantage for the pro se plaintiff. According to the
court, ghostwriting enabled one attorney to launch an "attack" on
another without disclosing his identity. The court further grounded
its objection to ghostwriting by alluding to the (also unspecified)
"extra strain" of its labors to protect the plaintiff's rights.21
The court did not, however, compel disclosure of the ghost-
writing attorney's identity. Instead, it stated that it was "con-
strained to ... measure plaintiff's papers with the same preciseness
[that it applied] to the claims of the most deserving, ' 22 implying
that the plaintiff was not in such category. With great reluctance,
the court found that, while certain claims could be disposed of on
18. Id. at 342-43.
19. JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, BARRY MAHONEY, HARVEY SOLOMON & JOAN GREEN,
MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR
JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 60 (1998) [hereinafter MEETING THE CHALLENGE].
20. Klein, 309 F. Supp. at 342 (referring to an injunction against future
harassment).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 343.
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their merits, others could not, caustically adding its regret that
"having blunted [the plaintiff's] spear, we cannot also impale him
upon it."23
The second opinion relied upon in Johnson was based on a sub-
sequent action by the same pro se plaintiff in Klein L In Klein v.
H.N. Whitney, Goadby & Co. 24 (Klein II), the court described the
case as "yet another of the endless suits of plaintiff Ernest Klein. 25
It cited the opinion Klein I (written by a different judge) and
echoed its position on the ghostwriting issue in dicta.26 The court
characterized ghostwriting as being-in some unstated manner--
grossly unfair to the court and the opposing lawyers and therefore
not to be tolerated.2 7 The court indicated that some of the plain-
tiff's arguments and papers strongly suggested that he was enjoying
the assistance of a lawyer who had not formally appeared in the
case.
28
The third case relied upon in Johnson is Ellis v. Maine,29 which
involved a pro se prisoner who sought a free transcript to prepare a
petition for relief from his judgment and conviction. In denying
relief, the court stated:
In a growing number of petitions, of which this is one, the peti-
tioner appears pro se, asserts complete ignorance of the law, and
then presents a brief which, however insufficient, was manifestly
written by someone with some legal knowledge. We are entirely
agreeable to a petitioner having what is colloquially termed a
jailhouse lawyer. What we fear is that in some cases actual
members of the bar represent petitioners, informally or other-
wise, and prepare briefs for them which the assisting lawyers do
not sign.3°
The court in Ellis did not, however, rest its condemnation of
ghostwriting on the unfair advantage argument. Rather, it found
the practice to violate Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.31
23. Id. at 344.
24. Klein v. H.N. Whitney, Goadby & Co., 341 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
25. Id. at 700.
26. Id. at 702-03.
27. Id. at 702.
28. Id.
29. Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1971).
30. Id. at 1328.
31. See infra notes 130-49 and accompanying text.
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Several years after Johnson, the court in Laremont-Lopez v.
Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Center32 also condemned
ghostwriting. The case involved four attorneys who represented
pro se plaintiffs in unsuccessful proceedings before the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission. The attorneys were unwilling
to represent the plaintiffs further in the federal actions. Instead,
the attorneys drafted complaints on their clients' behalf that were
then filed in federal court.33 The court learned of the ghostwriting
from representations the plaintiffs made to the clerk of court, and
from "the content of certain documents."34 In condemning ghost-
writing, the court cited Johnson35 and vehemently declared that the
practice would not be tolerated.36
The court stated that "a pro se complaint must survive a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 'unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 37 The
court referred to this relaxed standard" as a "necessary accommo-
dation to those unable to obtain the assistance of one trained in the
law."' 38  The court explained the undue advantage argument as
follows:
When ... complaints drafted by attorneys are filed bearing the
signature of a plaintiff outwardly proceeding pro se, the indul-
gence extended to the pro se party has the perverse effect of
skewing the playing field rather than leveling it. The pro se
plaintiff enjoys the benefit of the legal counsel while also being
subjected to the less stringent standard reserved for those pro-
32. Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp.
1075 (E.D. Va. 1997).
33. Id. at 1077.
The extent of the Attorneys' involvement varied with each case. In all four
cases, the Attorneys drafted the complaints filed in this Court. In at least
three cases, the Attorneys were paid a flat fee for their limited representa-
tion of the plaintiffs. In some cases the representation included unsuccessful
efforts to resolve the employee disputes prior to filing the complaints. In
some cases the Attorneys' courier filed the complaints and even paid the
filing fee out of their Law Firm's escrow account. In one case, the Attorneys
effectuated service of process on the defendant. Despite their participation
in these cases, in only one case did the Attorneys ever make a formal ap-
pearance as the counsel of record, and that was after the complaint was filed.
Id.
34. Id. at 1076.
35. Id. at 1078.
36. Id. at 1080.
37. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1078 (quoting Lugo v. INS, 950 F. Supp. 743,
745 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
38. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1078.
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ceeding without the benefit of counsel. This situation places the
opposing party at an unfair disadvantage, interferes with the ef-
ficient administration of justice, and constitutes a misrepresenta-
tion to the Court.39
In Laremont-Lopez and the other cases discussed, there was no
evidence or allegation of specific harm caused by ghostwriting.
These decisions also failed to analyze the undue advantage argu-
ment beyond reciting that liberal treatment of pro se pleadings,
coupled with more stringent treatment of attorney-drafted plead-
ings, results in an undue advantage to the pro se litigant who uses
ghostwritten documents. The principle, having emerged from cases
involving an atypically litigious pro se litigant, continues to be re-
cited and relied upon. Recent cases, like Laremont-Lopez, also fail
to specify any actual harm from ghostwriting. °
39. Id. There is a large body of case law indicating that, except for liberality in
pleading construction, pro se litigants are on their own. Plaintiffs take their chances
when proceeding pro se because judges have no duty to assist them in navigating the
justice system. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); Maclin v. Paulson, 627
F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1980). Pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
represented parties with respect to rule compliance. See, e.g., BirI v. Estelle, 660 F.2d
592 (5th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1977). Some courts have
required specific notice to pro se litigants-by the clerk of court or opposing coun-
sel-of certain rules and their effects (e.g., dispositive motions). See, e.g., Moore v.
Florida, 703 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1983); Heron v. Beck, 693 F.2d 125 (11th Cir. 1982).
Others make general reference to liberality in treatment throughout the litigation.
See, e.g., Phillips v. United States Bd. of Parole, 352 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The
range of attitudes has been observed empirically. See GOLDSCHMIDT, MEETING THE
CHALLENGE, supra note 19, at 52-61 (noting a range of judicial attitudes toward pro se
litigants, from the traditional/strict-rule-compliance view to the progressive/relaxed-
rule-compliance view); Joseph M. McLaughlin, An Extension of the Right of Access:
The Pro Se Litigant's Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judg-
ment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1109, 1111-23 (1987) (collecting cases establishing
that some courts treat pro se litigants more favorably, while other courts do not ac-
cord self-represented litigants any special treatment).
40. See, e.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-73 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that
(a) drafting an appellate brief afforded the plaintiff the benefit of the court's liberal
construction of pro se pleadings and inappropriately shielded the ghostwriting attor-
ney from responsibility and accountability for his actions and counsel, (b) defense
counsel's motion for sanctions against the ghostwriting attorney would be denied, and
(c) admonishing him that ghostwritten briefs would in the future result in possible
sanctions); Barnett v. LeMaster, No. 00-2455, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7874, at *9-12,
23-24 (10th Cir. Apr. 27, 2001) (following Duran and holding that a ghostwritten mo-
tion for appointment of counsel gave an unfair advantage to the pro se litigant whose
pleadings were afforded a more liberal construction than those drafted by an attor-
ney, and ordering counsel who drafted the motion to file an appearance, but not
describing any specific harm); Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16178, at *33 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2000) (holding that ghostwriting in the form
of a photocopy of a petition drafted by a foreign attorney in a previous action, but
signed and filed by the petitioner pro se, was a violation of the court's rules (i.e., Rule
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One court has cautioned that complaints of ghostwriting must be
factually supported, establishing that the ghostwriting did in fact
occur. In Somerset Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kimball,41 the plaintiff
moved to strike the pro se defendant's allegedly ghostwritten
pleadings. The defendant's pleadings had been filed over the span
of the two years following the defendant's attorney's withdrawal
from the case. The court agreed in principle with the Johnson
opinion's holding that ghostwriting violates an attorney's duty of
candor to the court. The court stated that ghostwriting taints the
legal process by creating disparity between the parties. 42 Nonethe-
less, the court never reached the question of undue advantage,
finding that more than a mere supposition of ghostwriting must be
alleged before the court would "thoroughly prejudice a party by
striking all their pleadings. '43 The court distinguished the situation
before it from the Johnson case because in Johnson the pleadings
were admittedly drafted by an attorney; in Somerset, however, the
court found the pleadings were prepared by the pro se defendant
himself. The defendant had merely used a style learned from the
pleadings his former attorney had prepared before withdrawing. 44
There is only one reported case in which an unrepresented party
sought to improperly take advantage of the purported liberal inter-
pretation accorded pro se pleadings. In Wesley v. Don Stein Buick,
Inc. ,'4 the court denied defense counsel's motion for an order com-
pelling the plaintiff (who was an attorney) to disclose the identity
of any ghostwriting attorney assisting her, or, alternately, to dis-
close whether she herself was an attorney.46 The plaintiff had
claimed she was entitled to pro se status.47 Interestingly, the court,
11), but would not be stricken because the acts in the case were "not specifically
prohibited by the Rules and did not result in Petitioner gaining an unfair advantage
over Respondent"); Ricotta v. State of California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 985-88 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (citing Ellis, Johnson, and Laremont-Lopez, supra, with approval, and finding
more than limited legal assistance to a pro se plaintiff to be "unprofessional conduct,"
but refusing to grant motion to hold attorney in contempt for ghostwriting seventy-
five to a hundred percent of the pro se's response because attorney had no intent to
mislead and because professional rules of conduct and court rules fail to provide
"clear guidance" on an "interesting and complex" issue).
41. Somerset Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kimball, 168 F.R.D. 69 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
42. Id. at 72.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Kan. 1997).
46. Defendants pointed out that the plaintiff had signed her pleadings with the
suffix "esq.," and that "her papers ... display[ed] a better level of legal knowledge
than one might expect from a lay person." Id. at 1294 n.2.
47. Id.
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in denying the defense motion,48 said that it would recognize the
plaintiff's pro se status and would not construe her pleadings any
less liberally despite her disclosure.49
In evaluating the undue advantage argument, we should first ex-
amine the contention that pro se litigants' pleadings are more liber-
ally construed than those drafted by counsel. It is true that in
Haines v. Kerner,50 the Supreme Court announced a liberal con-
struction rule for pro se pleadings attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss. Fifteen years before Haines was decided, however,
the Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson, held that no complaint
may be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless "it appears be-
yond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief."'51 This standard is the
same as the liberal construction rule for pro se plaintiffs in Haines.
The Supreme Court has since held that all complaints must be
"construed generously, '5 2 and that a court, on a 12(b)(6) motion,
"must presume that the general allegations in the complaint en-
compass the specific facts necessary to support those allegations. '5 3
Thus, all pleadings, pro se or otherwise, are entitled to the liberal
pleading rules of Conley v. Gibson54 and must be construed favora-
bly to the pleader.5 The liberal construction rule for both attor-
ney-drafted and pro se pleadings may explain the comment of the
court in Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc.: "[The court will] not con-
strue the plaintiff's pleadings, on the motions now pending, any
less liberally regardless of the plaintiff's disclosure on this
subject. 56
48. Id. at 1307.
49. Id. at 1294 n.2. The magistrate's previous grant of the motion to compel dis-
closure of the ghostwriter's identity or to compel plaintiff to declare whether she was
an attorney had been granted on similar grounds raised by the previous cases: that
ghostwriting violates the ethical duty of candor to the tribunal and Rule 11; that the
disclosure sought may be compelled in the exercise of the court's inherent discretion;
and, because the plaintiff "suggested that the court consider her status pro se in con-
struing [the pending motions to dismiss] and her pleadings." Id. at 886. Significantly,
plaintiff had opposed the motion by arguing that, if granted, it would constitute an
"unlawful intrusion into privileged information." Id. at 887. The latter argument is
discussed infra in notes 268-280 and the accompanying text.
50. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
51. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
52. Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 230 n.10 (2000).
53. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998) (citing Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)).
54. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 721 (1983).
55. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
56. Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 n.2 (D. Kan. 1997).
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In most civil cases, defense counsel will make a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim,57 a motion for summary judg-
ment,58 or both. Courts are required to administer the civil
procedure rules governing such motions "to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action. ' 59 There are two
grounds for granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim:
the use of conclusory or non-specific allegations or the failure to
allege a required element of the asserted cause of action.60 As to
the conclusory or non-specific allegations, the objection is that
plaintiff failed to provide the defendant the required "(1) ... short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdic-
tion depends. . ., (2) a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment for the relief the pleader seeks."'6 1 As to the missing ele-
ment objection, the movant typically presents authorities to estab-
lish that a required element of the cause of action is lacking;62 that
a notice or exhaustion requirement has not been met; 63 or that a
statute of limitations bars the claim.64 In the case of summary
judgment, the defendant's argument is factually based but relates
to similar deficiencies, asserting that the defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.65
Upon receipt of such motions, the plaintiff has a right to file an
amended complaint once before a responsive pleading is served
and thereafter by leave of court.66 Assuming the pro se litigant is
made aware of this rule, any deficiencies in the litigant's pleadings,
as enumerated in the motion to dismiss, will either be corrected
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following de-
fenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ... (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Id.
58. "A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof."
FED. R. Crv. P. 56(b).
59. FED. R. Cv. P. 1.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
61. Id.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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with an amended complaint or result in the claim being dis-
missed.67 Thus, it does not matter whether the court applies the
general liberal construction standard of Conley v. Gibson or the
pro-se liberal construction standard of Haines v. Kerner. It is a dis-
tinction without a difference. In either case the plaintiff will seek
to correct the deficiencies that were alleged in the motion to dis-
miss or included in the court's ruling on the motions. As such,
where is the undue advantage or unfairness to the represented
party?
The dark scenario envisioned by ghostwriting opponents is that a
pro se litigant will file a ghostwritten, but presumably frivolous or
otherwise dismissible action. The court, in denying the defendant's
dispositive motions, will erroneously apply the pro se (super) lib-
eral construction rule, thus permitting the matter to proceed to
trial. If the court applied a more stringent standard (i.e., the "nor-
mal" liberality rule) to ghostwriting pleadings, the same complaint
would not likely survive. Practically speaking, however, ghost-
writing is obvious from the face of the legal papers filed, a fact that
prompts objections to ghostwriting in the first place. This obvi-
ousness is reflected in the case law on the subject.68 Thus, where
the court sees the higher quality of the pleadings, there is no reason
to apply any liberality in construction because liberality is, by defi-
nition, only necessary where pleadings are obscure. If the pleading
can be clearly understood, but an essential fact or element is miss-
ing, neither an attorney-drafted nor a pro se-drafted complaint
should survive the motions. A court that refuses to dismiss or
enter summary judgment against a non-ghostwritten pro se plead-
ing that lacks essential facts or elements commits reversible error
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Clarke v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 593, 598 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("No-
tably, the true author of plaintiff's putatively pro se pleadings and supporting docu-
ments appears to have had formal legal training"); Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern
Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1076 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("Based on...
the contents of certain documents, it appeared that the complaints were in fact
drafted by the attorneys of a local law firm"); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868
F. Supp. 1226, 1229 (D. Colo. 1994) ("The pleading, too, was obviously drafted by a
lawyer"); Klein v. H.N. Whitney, Goadby & Co., 341 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
("[A]s other judges of this court have noted,.. . his answering papers strongly suggest
that he is enjoying the assistance of a lawyer . . . ."); Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325,
1328 (1st Cir. 1971) ("In a growing number of petitions.., the Petitioner... presents
a brief which, however insufficient, was manifestly written by someone with some
legal knowledge"). See also Alaska Bar Assoc. Op. 93-1 (1993) ("[J]udges are usually
able to discern when a pro se litigant has received the assistance of counsel in prepar-
ing or drafting pleadings. In that event, the Committee believes that any preferential
treatment otherwise afforded the litigant will likely be tempered, if not overlooked.").
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in the same manner as if it refuses to deny such dispositive motions
against an attorney-drafted complaint.6 9
Consider the case of two pro se adversary parties, one of whom
has ghostwriting assistance and the other of whom does not.
Under these circumstances, most people would say that the as-
sisted party has an unfair advantage. This is just as true, however,
when a pro se plaintiff is opposed by a represented adversary. The
point is that ghostwriting, rather than unfairly advantaging the pro
se, helps level the playing field and provides a vehicle for enhanc-
ing the pro se litigant's access to justice.
Realistically, a pro se-drafted pleading is more likely to be dis-
missed or otherwise disposed of regardless of the standard applied
by the court. When pro se litigants have no attorney to advise
them of the necessary elements or factual averments of their
claims, the represented party has the undue advantage. Permitting
ghostwriting so that complaints are adequately crafted levels the
playing field. It also streamlines the litigation process by clarifying
the issues and reducing the number of dispositive motions and
responses.
In summary, courts that have addressed ghostwriting have al-
most uniformly condemned it on grounds, among others, that it
gives the pro se litigant an unfair advantage.70 Ghostwriting com-
plaints are primarily raised by attorneys who wish to maintain their
advantage over pro se litigants. Such attorneys attack their pro se
adversaries by claiming unfairness in pleading construction stan-
dards and attacking the professional conduct of ghostwriting attor-
neys." Yet the opinions on the issue cite no specific harm, and fail
to analyze the unfair advantage argument.72 Instead these opinions
accept the argument on its face and vilify the ghostwriting attorney
69. It should be noted that the federal rules also provide that "All pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
70. But see Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001).
[P]articipation by an attorney in drafting an appellate brief is per se substan-
tial, and must be acknowledged by signature .... We caution, however, that
the mere assistance of drafting, especially before a trial court, will not totally
obviate some kind of lenient treatment due a substantially pro se litigant.
Id.
71. See, e.g., Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 343 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (holding that the ghost-written pleading "smacks of the gross unfairness that
characterizes hit-and-run tactics").
72. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo.
1994) (offering rationales based on professional ethics to illustrate the harms of ghost-
writing, but citing to no actual harm).
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as a violator of court rules and ethical principles. As a result, attor-
neys are discouraged from providing unbundled legal services.
B. Other Rationales Based on Deception
Courts and ethics opinions often cite ghostwriting as a breach of
ethical duties and prohibitions concerning deception. The practice
has been characterized as a breach of the duties of candor to the
court 73 and fairness to opposing party and counsel." Ghostwriting
has been held to violate the ethical prohibitions against (1) dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,7 5 (2) conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice,76 and (3) the violation of ethics
rules through the acts of another.77 Before examining these
charges, note that most ghostwriting cases and ethics opinions con-
cede that the attorney-client relationship may properly be limited
in objectives and means:
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued ....
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if
the client consents after consultation.78
According to the commentary on rule 1.2:
The objectives or scope of services provided by a lawyer may be
limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under
which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. For
example, a retainer may be for a specifically defined purpose.
Representation provided through a legal aid agency may be sub-
ject to limitations on the types of cases the agency handles ....
The terms upon which representation is undertaken may ex-
clude specific objectives or means .... The client may not be
asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to violate
Rule 1.1 [providing that a lawyer "shall provide competent rep-
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
74. Id. at R. 3.4.
75. Id. at R. 8.4(c).
76. Id. at R. 8.4(d).
77. Id. at R. 8.4(a). But see John C. Rothermich, Note, Ethical and Procedural
Implications of 'Ghostwriting' for Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil
Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2728 (1999) (reviewing applicable ethical duties
and prohibitions, and cautioning against "stifling the development of these new mod-
els of legal practice through application of ethical and procedural norms that were
designed with full-service, traditional representation in mind.").
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1983).
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resentation to a client" which "requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation"], or to surrender the right to terminate the law-
yer's services ....
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers7 9 recog-
nizes the attorney's duty to "proceed in a manner reasonably calcu-
lated to advance a client's lawful objectives, as defined by the client
after consultation." The Restatement also recognizes duties of rea-
sonable competence, diligence, confidentiality, avoidances of con-
flicts, honest dealing with the client, not employing advantages
arising from the attorney-client relationship, and fulfilling "valid
contractual obligations to the client."8 Under the Restatement, a
client and lawyer may agree to limit a duty that a lawyer would
otherwise owe to a client if the client is adequately informed and
consents and the terms of the limitation are reasonable.81 Limited
legal services, commonplace in transactional law, are the only op-
tion for many parties, especially in family law, because the costs of
more extensive services often outweigh the benefits.82
The Restatement provides five safeguards for limited services
agreements:
1. a client "must be informed of any significant problems a limi-
tation might entail and the client must consent,"
2. "any contract limiting the representation is construed from
the standpoint of a reasonable client,"
3. "the fee charged by the lawyer must remain reasonable in
view of the limited representation,"
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS].
80. Id. § 16(l)-(2). Comment (c) notes:
Individual clients define their objectives differently .... The client, not the
lawyer, determines the goals to be pursued, subject to the lawyer's duty not
to do or assist an unlawful act . . . . The lawyer's duties are ordinarily limited
to matters covered by the representation .... Ordinarily, the lawyer may not
act beyond the scope of contemplated representation without additional au-
thorization from the client .... [However, a] lawyer owes duties to the court
or the legal system and to an opposing party in litigation.
Id. § 16 cmt. (c). Comment (f) provides:
Contracts generally create or define the duties the lawyer owes the client ...
One or more contracts between client and lawyer may specify the services
the lawyer is being retained to provide, the services the lawyer is not obliged
to provide, and the goals of the representation.
Id. § 16 cmt. (f).
81. Id. § 19(1)(a)-(b).
82. Id. § 19 cmt. (b).
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4. "any change made an unreasonably long time after the repre-
sentation begins must meet the more stringent tests of § 18(1)
for postinception contracts or modification," and
5. "the terms of the limitation must in all events be reasonable
in the circumstances., 8 3
The commentary cautions that "Reasonableness also requires
that limits on a lawyer's work agreed to by client and lawyer not
infringe on legal rights of third persons or legal institutions.
Hence, a contract limiting a lawyer's role during trial may require
the tribunal's approval. 's4 Clients, therefore, have a clear right to
enter limited services agreements.
Objections to ghostwriting must also be considered in the con-
text of lawyers' other professional obligations. These include the
duty to "seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice
and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. 8 15
Lawyers must also be "mindful of deficiencies in the administration
of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who
are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should
therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their
behalf." 6
The duty of candor to the tribunal contained in Model Rule 3.3
includes a prohibition on the making of "a false statement of mate-
rial fact or law to the tribunal. '8 The duty also obligates an attor-
ney to disclose "a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the cli-
ent. 8 8 There is no reference in the rule to limited legal services
such as ghostwriting. Aside from the Rule 1.2 language permitting
limited legal services, the Model Rules do not contain any other
reference to limited services in pending litigation. The vagueness
of the situation has not been lost on the ABA. One ABA director,
83. Id. § 19 cmt. (c).
84. Id.
85. MODEL RULES, supra note 73, at pmbl.
86. Id.; see also Alaska State Bar Ass'n Op. 93-1 (1993).
The attorney requesting the ethics opinion states that he is helping many pro
se litigants prepare their own child support modification motions. Many of
these litigants, he states, are unable to obtain legal counsel due to their poor
financial condition. Assistance with their self-help efforts presents one of
their few options for access to the courts. EC 2-33 stresses the legal profes-
sion's commitment to making high quality legal services available to all.
Id.
87. See MODEL RULES, supra note 73, at R. 3.3(a)(1) (2001).
88. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(2).
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in a presentation to the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission, described
the ambiguity surrounding the ethics of ghostwriting as follows:
Unfortunately, conflicting opinions have been issued by state
bars, federal courts and commentators about the propriety of
this practice. Because ghostwriting raises unresolved issues,
such as whether it constitutes a fraud on the court or whether
the attorney who provides ghostwriting services must make an
appearance on behalf of the client, there is a need for clarity in a
rule.... [Therefore,] we are not yet prepared to propose a de-
finitive resolution concerning the scope of any proposed rule.89
A comment to Rule 3.3 (candor to tribunal) gives some guidance
to the ghostwriting attorney: "An advocate is responsible for
pleadings and other document prepared for litigation, but is usually
not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted
therein." 9° The same commentary also states, without providing
any examples, that "[t]here are circumstances where failure to
make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation." 91
The candor-to-the-tribunal rule prohibits the following acts:
making false statements to the court;92 failing to disclose a material
fact to a tribunal when necessary to avoid assisting a client commit
a crime or fraud;93 failing to disclose controlling, adverse legal au-
thority to the court;94 and offering evidence known to be false.95
These duties "continue to the conclusion of the proceeding." 96 The
89. See Alan W. Housman, Director, Center for Law and Social Policy, Excepts
[sic] From Testimony on Ethics 2000, at 6 (2000). Housman goes further by pointing
out that
some members have commented that civil legal assistance providers will be
chilled from ghostwriting if they must disclose the names of their attorneys.
Others have argued that there are dangers to the administration of justice in
not requiring disclosure. There also may be a need to clarify what docu-
ments would come under the term "ghostwriting." One suggested remedy to
these issues is to adopt a rule requiring disclosure only of the fact that an
attorney had authored the document instead of disclosing the attorney's
name.
Id. at 7. Housman also cites promising new Colorado and Maine court rules, de-
scribed infra notes 232-34 and in the accompanying text, that permit ghostwriting,
require ghostwriters to declare their identity, and declare that ghostwriting does not
constitute an appearance.
90. See MODEL RULES, supra note 73, at R. 3.3 cmt.
91. Id.
92. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(1).
93. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(2).
94. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).
95. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(4).
96. Id. at R. 3.3(b).
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rule's commentary refers to the "advocate's task," the "advocate's
duty of candor to the tribunal," and the advocate's responsibility
for pleadings and documents, indicating that it is directed to attor-
neys appearing in court as advocates. 97 Confusion reigns, there-
fore, regarding the scope of the duty of candor to the tribunal, and
the question of whether that rule, or others, obligates an attorney
advising or ghostwriting for a pro se litigant to enter a formal ap-
pearance of record.
The early cases reflecting judicial disapproval of ghostwriting did
not find violations of the ethical duty of candor to the tribunal.
Rather, their concerns were that ghostwriting adds to the court's
work of protecting pro se litigants98 and permits one attorney to
attack another without "showing his face." 99 Courts also found the
practice of ghostwriting to be grossly unfair,100 because there is "no
good or sufficient reason for depriving the opposition and the
Court of the identity of the legal representative(s) involved so that
[the court] can proceed properly and with the relative assurance
that comes from dealing in the open"'0 ' and because of the possi-
bility of a Rule 11 violation.10 2 It was only after the issuance in
1978 of an ABA ethics opinion that courts began condemning
ghostwriting on ethical grounds. 103
ABA Opinion 1414 involved an attorney who drafted a pro se
litigant's pleadings and memoranda, sat in on his client's trial, and
provided him advice-all without entering a formal appearance.
The opinion has been cited by almost every court and state ethics
committee addressing ghostwriting. The ABA Standing Commit-
tee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility found that an attor-
ney who gives advice to, or prepares a pleading for a pro se litigant
does not violate any of the Canons of Ethics under the former
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 0 4 However, if a
lawyer provides additional legal services, the propriety of the law-
yer's actions will depend upon the facts involved and the extent of
the lawyer's participation on behalf of a litigant who appears to the
court and other counsel as being without professional representa-
97. MODEL RULES, supra note 73, at R. 3.3 cmt.
98. See Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
99. Id. at 343.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 342.
102. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971).
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tion. °5 Extensive, undisclosed participation by a lawyer that per-
mits the litigant ,to falsely appear as lacking professional assistance
is improper. 10 6
Such extensive participation violated the predecessors of Model
Rule 3.3, namely DR 1-102(A) and former ABA Model Code pro-
visions that relate to the duty of candor to the court. Thus, the
ABA opinion find that ghostwriting a pleading or other limited le-
gal services are not a breach of the duty of candor, but a breach
will arise if the participation of the attorney is "extensive."
ABA Opinion 1414 is noteworthy for several reasons. In addi-
tion to the applicable ethical rules, the opinion cites the ghost-
writing cases discussed earlier, Klein I, Klein II, and Ellis. The first
two cases were actions by an unusually litigious pro se litigant; the
third was an action by a pro se prisoner who petitioned for a free
transcript. These cases themselves made no reference to rules of
professional responsibility. In Klein I, the sole case used to support
the Klein II and Ellis cases, the attorneys had
been, and still are, actively assisting [the plaintiff] with legal ad-
vice .. .by drawing up the papers [relating to summary judg-
ment] . . . .It is one thing to give some free legal advice
(incidentally, plaintiff is apparently not indigent); quite another
to participate so extensively and not reveal one's identity ....
[W]e see no good or sufficient reason for depriving the opposi-
tion and the Court of the identity of the legal representative(s)
involved so that we can proceed properly and with the relative
assurance that comes from dealing in the open.10 7
The Klein I court did not establish a causal relationship between
the plaintiff's litigiousness and his attorney's ghostwriting, although
it implied such a relationship existed. The court did not point to
any specific harm to the defendants from the acts of the ghost-
writer; nor did it cite any ethical rules in support of its conclusion.
Rather, the court seems to have been reacting to the unusual na-
ture of the plaintiff's attorney-client relationship and the limited
scope of the representation agreement between them. 108 The ratio-
nale assumes that non-appearing ghostwriters have a duty to "deal
in the open" 109 with the court, which, in turn, implies that any at-
105. Id.
106. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1969) (know-
ingly making a false statement of law or fact); id. at DR 7-102(A)(3) (knowingly fail-
ing to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal).
107. Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
108. Id. at 342.
109. Id.
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torney who does more than "give some free legal advice"" to a
litigating client becomes subject to the candor-to-the-court obliga-
tions. This raises the question of whether an attorney subject to
the candor-to-the-tribunal duties can then be compelled to enter an
appearance and involuntarily provide legal services beyond those
provided for in the scope-of-the-representation agreement.
ABA Opinion 1414 agreed with the Klein I court that some legal
services can be provided a pro se litigant without invoking ethical
obligations of disclosure."' The ABA Opinion found that a can-
dor-to-the-tribunal obligation arises when there is "extensive and
undisclosed participation ... that permits the litigant falsely to ap-
pear as being without substantial assistance."" 2
The post-Opinion 1414 state ethics opinions uniformly acknowl-
edge that unbundled legal services-by agreement of lawyer and
client-are specifically authorized in the rules of professional re-
sponsibility.1 3 These opinions also agree that limited services rep-
resentation implicates all of the ethical obligations of full-service
representation. These obligations include competent representa-
tion (Rule 1.3), the duty of diligence and zealous advocacy (Rule
1.3), and the duty not to withdraw if withdrawal would cause mate-
rial adverse effects to a client's interests unless for good cause
(Rule 1.16).114
110. Id.
111. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978).
112. Id. The question then becomes the following: At what point does such assis-
tance become unethical unless disclosed to the court? The difficulty of drawing a
bright line "accounts for some discrepancy between the courts' condemnation of
ghostwriting and the endorsement of disclosed ghostwriting by some states' ethics
panels." See Rothermich, supra note 77, at 2707 (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2001-3 (2001); Colo.
Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Op. 101 (1998); N.C. State Bar Ass'n, R. Prof 1 Conduct
240 (1997); State Bar of Wis., Op. E-97-1 (1997); S.C. Bar Ass'n Op. 90-44 (1990); Ill.
State Bar Ass'n Op. 85-6 (1985); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 47
(1978) and Op. 98-14 (1998). One previous summarization of many of the state ethics
opinions regarding unbundling inaccurately divides the opinions into one category
entitled "Facilitates Unbundling" and another entitled "Raises Concern with Un-
bundling Issues." See MARLE ZIDE, MD. LEGAL ASSISTANCE NETWORK, RESULTS OF
INFORMAL NATIONAL SURVEY OF ETHICAL OPINIONS RELATED TO "DISCRETE TASK
LAWYERING, 1, 3 (2000), http://www.unbundledlaw.org. The concerns in the latter
opinions involve ethical issues relating to specific forms of unbundled services, such as
1-800 number telephone services, web sites, or ghostwriting, but do not question the
propriety of unbundled legal services per se.
114. MODEL RULES, supra note 73.
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These state ethics opinions1 5 are more lenient in outcome and
tone than the federal cases on ghostwriting. 1 6 The opinions, none
of which condemn ghostwriting per se, can be categorized into
three major groups: (1) those requiring disclosure of the fact that
"extensive" or "substantial" assistance beyond drafting of plead-
ings was or is being received (the ABA Opinion 1414 approach);1 17
(2) those finding that the mere act of ghostwriting a pleading and
little more constitutes extensive or substantial assistance and re-
quires disclosure of the personal identity of the ghostwriter 1 8 or
disclosure of the fact that such assistance was received;119 and (3)
those finding that attorneys entering into limited legal services ar-
rangements are bound by all professional responsibility rules, but
that no disclosure to the court of their assistance is required. 120
115. There appear to be no state cases discussing ghostwriting.
116. One commentator has noted the "discrepancy between the courts' vehement
condemnation of ghostwriting and the more lenient perspective of state ethics panels,
which generally condone the practice." See Rothermich, supra note 77, at 2698.
117. See Fla. Bar Ass'n Op. 79-7 (2000) (requiring the phrase "Prepared with the
Assistance of Counsel" to appear on ghostwritten pleadings); N. H. State Bar Ass'n,
Op. (unnumbered) (May 12, 1999) (requiring that ghostwritten pleadings state "This
pleading was prepared with the assistance of a New Hampshire Attorney"). Some
opinions just indicate the applicable ethics violations where assistance beyond legal
advice and drafting of pleadings is provided, without indicating whether the fact that
limited legal services was received, or the identity of the ghostwriter, is required. See,
e.g., Mass. Bar Ass'n, Op. 98-1 (1998) (attorney providing "substantial and undis-
closed involvement" in a pending case is guilty of violating the duty of candor to the
tribunal: "ongoing behind-the-scenes representation runs a risk of circumventing the
whole panoply of ethical restraints that would be binding upon the attorney if she was
visible"); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. 74 (1981) (finding that an attorney is
guilty of misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(4) if he provides "any additional as-
sistance" beyond preparation of pleadings and the client "continues to inform the
court that he is proceeding pro se").
118. See Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics and Conduct, Op. 96-07 (1996)
(noting that the identity of a military attorney must be disclosed where he has assisted
military personnel with "review of the case and in preparation of the pleadings");
Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics and Conduct, Op. 96-31 (1996) (requiring
identity of ghostwriter of dissolution petition "for an indigent who wishes to proceed
pro se"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 613 (1990).
119. See N.Y. City Bar Op. 1987-2 (1987) (disclosure of role, but not attorney's
personal identity, required in any case involving the preparation of a pleading no
matter how extensive the participation).
120. See L.A. County Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 502 (1999) (noting that where an attor-
ney's engagement is "limited to that of a law consultant who advises client on matters
only as client requests, assists in or drafts papers that client will sign and file and
attempts to negotiate a settlement" with defense counsel, there is no duty to disclose
limited scope of representation to the court so long as attorney complies with all other
ethics and court rules, and informs client of importance of complying with court rule
governing content and form of pleadings); Alaska Bar Ass'n Op. 93-1 (1993) (finding
no duty for attorney to disclose limited legal services to the court where client under-
1166
2002] IN DEFENSE OF GHOSTWRITING 1167
None of the state ethics cases address the issues of confidentiality
or the attorney-client privilege as they relate to ghostwriting or
other unbundled services.
Under most state ethics opinions, the court could compel disclo-
sure of the personal identity of any attorney who drafts a pleading
filed with the court or likely to be filed with the court 12 1 and is
otherwise found by the court to have "extensively" participated in
litigation. The court could also order the terms of the representa-
tion agreement to be disclosed. This could result in a non-uniform
exercise of discretion on an ad hoc basis. Different judges under
different factual scenarios could decide, based on their definition
of "extensive" or "substantial" assistance, whether an attorney is
guilty of ethics violations for failing to enter a formal appearance.
If a pro se party desires that the details of his attorney-client rela-
tionship be kept confidential, the order to disclose the ghostwriter
and the terms of the representation agreement would be an un-
precedented violation of the attorney-client privilege. Such disclo-
sure would force the attorney to breach a confidentiality
agreement because a judge has decided that the fact of legal assis-
tance and the confidential nature thereof must be "in the open."'
122
stands the limitation, is informed of the risks of proceeding pro se, and where applica-
ble ethics and pleadings rules are followed).
121. See Rothermich, supra note 77, at 2696. In the case of ghostwriting attorneys
who draft documents for clients "knowing that they will eventually be filed in court,
all of the ethics rules regarding the attorneys' duties to the court and to opposing
counsel apply." Id. The question thus becomes, What type of document qualifies as
one that "will eventually be filed in court"? Does this mean that a lawyer who drafts
a contract for a client, that he reasonably believes under the circumstances will "even-
tually be filed with the court" in future litigation has an affirmative obligation to dis-
close his identity to the client's adversary upon the start of (or before) litigation about
the contract? If this is the case, many attorneys are probably not aware of this obliga-
tion. If the court seeks accountability on the part of attorneys because there may be
reason to believe they have engaged in some impropriety, they have the inherent
power to hail them into court or compel someone before the court to identify them
for that purpose. This argument is not intended as a challenge to the court's obvious
authority to enforce the law and court rules; rather, it challenges the authority of
courts to enforce a blanket disclosure requirement on all ghostwriting cases, or man-
date disclosure in cases that lack reasonable grounds to believe that the ghostwriting
attorney breached some rule or ethical duty independent of providing ghostwriting
and other ordinary legal services.
122. See infra notes 260-74, and accompanying text. While some courts are worried
about an "unseen hand" guiding pro se litigation, see, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo. 1994), courts generally have not been
concerned with ethical violations by non-appearing law partners or supervisors of
public law offices who extensively guide the litigation of their associates; of counsel
attorneys who are influential in guiding the litigation of other law firms; and in-house
counsel or non-attorneys, such as insurance claims managers, that guide the litigation
involving their company-all "sight unseen."
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As argued below, 123 contrary to the case law and many ethics opin-
ions on the subject, courts may not without cause compel an attor-
ney or client to breach a client confidence that may consist of the
fact and identity of legal counsel or the scope of a representation
agreement.
As to the other rules of professional responsibility that prohibit
deception, a24 the question is whether the attorney ghostwriter com-
mits acts of misrepresentation, dishonesty, deceit, or fraud upon
the court or opposing counsel. None of the relevant rules state as
much, but the courts and ethics opinions uniformly reach this con-
clusion. It is clear that non-appearing attorneys have duties to the
court, the administration of justice, and adverse parties and their
attorneys. 125 The question is whether ghostwriting attorneys who
go beyond drafting a pleading-absent reasonable grounds to be-
lieve in their or their client's intent to unlawfully deceive the court
or the opposing party-violate the ethical prohibitions against de-
ceptive conduct.
The cases and ethical opinions on the subject all follow the same
pattern. They present the laundry list of claimed ethical breaches
relating to deception, and from these conclude that an attorney
who fails to voluntarily disclose his or her ghostwriting for-or
counseling of-a client thereby commits an act of deception. 26
The absence of any evidence of a ghostwriter's intent to deceive
has not prevented courts and ethics committees from reaching this
conclusion. They merely harken back to the undue advantage ar-
gument127 and cite a litany of ethical duties that make no reference
123. See infra notes 270-82, and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 73-77, and accompanying text.
125. See Rothermich, supra note 77, at 2696-97 ("[E]thical considerations cannot be
limited to adequate regard for her client's interest, but must include the interests of
the courts and opposing parties involved in the envisioned litigation.").
126. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo.
1994).
127. See, e.g., N.H. Bar Ass'n, Op. 2 (unnumbered) (May 12, 1999) ("Several opin-
ions have raised concerns whether ghostwriting under some circumstances violates
Rule 3.3 (requiring candor to the tribunal) and Rule 4.1 (requiring truthfulness in
statements to others."); see also Mass. Bar Ass'n Op. 98-1 (1998); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978). These opinions fear that
the pro se litigant is attempting to gain an unfair tactical advantage, since pro se
pleadings have been held to 'less stringent standards,'" Mass. Bar Ass'n Op. 98-1
(1998) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). See also N.Y. City Bar Ass'n
Op. 1987-2 (finding that disclosure is not required if the lawyer merely assists pro se
litigant in filling out standard court forms, but failure to disclose active and substantial
assistance constitutes misrepresentation to the court and opposing counsel because
pro se litigants receive special consideration and preferential treatment from the
court).
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to the drafting or counseling assistance in question.121 These cases
and ethics opinions routinely, without analysis, equate an attor-
ney's "extensive" or "substantial" active assistance to a pro se liti-




A second set of arguments against ghostwriting asserts that
ghostwriting violates court rules that regulate papers filed with the
court and entries and withdrawals of appearances in pending litiga-
tion. Like the ethics rules, the court rules do not explicitly refer to
ghostwriting. Neither their language nor their spirit justify a blan-
ket prohibition on ghostwriting or active counseling of a pro se liti-
gant absent reasonable grounds to believe that those acts involve
intentional deception or efforts to avoid the rules.
1. Rule 11 and Similar Pleading Rules
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, by
signing a pleading, motion, or other paper, and by presenting it to
the court,
an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose...
(2) the claims, defenses , and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the estab-
lishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have eviden-
tiary support or... are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery;
and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evi-
dence or ... are reasonably based on a lack of information and
belief. 130
Sanctions are available for violations of the rule 3 1 as they are for
similar state court rules and statutes.
128. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo.
1994).
129. Id.
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a),(b)(1-4).
131. Id. at 11(c).
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Courts and ethics committees have erroneously presumed that a
ghostwriting attorney who renders substantial assistance to a pro se
litigant thereby deliberately violates Rule 11. For example, in Ellis
v. Maine,3 z the First Circuit complained that ghostwriting was oc-
curring in "a growing number" of prisoner petitions:
What we fear is that in some cases actual members of the bar
represent petitioners, informally or otherwise, and prepare
briefs for them which the assisting lawyers do not sign, and thus
escape the obligation imposed on members of the bar, typified
by F. R. Civ. P. 11, but which exists in all cases, criminal as well
as civil, or representing to the court that there is good ground to
support the assertions made. 133
Following Ellis, the Johnson court characterized undisclosed
ghostwriting as "deliberate evasion of the responsibilities imposed
on counsel by Rule 11."134 In Laremont-Lopez, the ghostwriting
attorneys did not sign the pleadings because they no longer repre-
sented the plaintiffs. The court found that this reasoning was "not
at odds with the plain language of Rule 11," yet held that the prac-
tice "undermines the purpose of the signature certification require-
ment of the rule": 135
Who should the Court sanction if claims in the complaint prove
to be legally or factually frivolous, or filed for an improper pur-
pose? .... Although the plaintiffs have signed the complaints,
they may assert immunity from sanctions because they retained
counsel to draft the complaints. Moreover, the Court could en-
counter legal and factual obstacles if it attempted to impose
sanctions on the Attorneys based on Rule 11 considerations ....
Even if the Court is able to determine who is responsible for
drafting the complaints, the additional inquiry necessitated by
the lawyers' failure to sign the pleadings interferes with the
"just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of those
actions.' 36
With few exceptions,' 37 these and later cases 138 harshly condemn
undisclosed ghostwriting, but only speculate as to potential
132. Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1978).
133. Id.
134. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231.
135. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1078.
136. Id. at 1079 (citations omitted).
137. See, e.g., Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998), denying a
motion for sanctions against ghostwriting attorney because, while the practice is "im-
proper" based on existing precedents,
The parties were unable to point the Court to any local, state or national rule
addressing ghostwriting ... [T]he facts of this case are not nearly egregious
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problems arising from the practice. Whatever harm or confusion
arose in the ghostwriting case law, none of it stemmed from im-
properly drafted pleadings. One case, for example, cites a legiti-
mate problem in determining whether the pro se litigant is
represented, because he filed ghostwritten pleadings but told the
clerk of court he was being represented.139 The pro se plaintiff re-
ceived ghostwriting assistance and was probably still getting advice
and counsel during the proceeding. The clerk and the court simply
could not figure out what this strange form of attorney-client rela-
tionship might be. Consequently, the court decided to castigate
counsel, finding his conduct not violative of any rule but neverthe-
less "improper. '" 140
The case of Ostevoll v. Ostevoll involved similar confusion re-
garding Rule 11. In Ostevoll, a pro se plaintiff living in Norway
enough for this Court to take the unprecedented step of holding an attorney
and a pro se party in contempt for giving and receiving assistance in the
drafting of documents. There is nothing in the record to indicate that...
[the attorney had any] intention to mislead or harm this Court and the other
parties involved.
Id. at 987. See also Olvera v. Edmundson, No. 1:01cv74-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13169, at *2 n.1 (W.D.N.C. June 15, 2001) (declining to sanction ghostwriting attor-
ney, but noting that
While not an unethical practice, the court notes that ghost-writing does little
for the judicial process, inasmuch as pro se litigants are ill-equipped to pros-
ecute the complex issues raised without continued legal assistance. If a mat-
ter is worthy of an attorney taking the time to draft a complaint, it is also
worthy of that attorney's personal appearance.)
138. See, e.g., Barnett v. LeMaster, No. 00-2455, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7874, at *9
(10th Cir. Apr. 27, 2001); Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001); Os-
tevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16178, at *30-32 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 16, 2000); cf. In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 733 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000) (condemn-
ing undisclosed ghostwriting on grounds, inter alia, that it violates Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy 9011, the counterpart of Rule 11).
139. See Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.
Supp. at 1079.
[T]his practice can disrupt the Court's efficient administration of justice.
The Attorneys maintain that they contracted with the plaintiffs for a "limited
engagement" to draft the complaints in these cases. Nevertheless, one of the
plaintiffs informed the Deputy Clerk of the Court on several occasions that
he continued to be represented in his civil action by the Attorneys. Upon
contacting the Attorneys, the Deputy Clerk was informed that they were not
representing the plaintiff. Hoping to eliminate the confusion, the Clerk re-
quested that the Attorneys write a letter for the Court's file confirming that
they are not representing the plaintiff. The Attorneys provided the letter
requested by the Clerk, but nowhere in the letter did the Attorneys disclose
that they had drafted the complaint filed in the plaintiff's case.
Id. The Laremont-Lopez court, however, never points to any problem with the ghost-
written pleadings.
140. Id. at 1080.
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brought a federal action challenging child custody.1 41 The court
was confused as to the identify of plaintiff's representative, because
it received various communications from the plaintiff, his foreign
attorney, and his local counsel. While Rule 11 was invoked, no
violation was found.142
In a third case, a bankruptcy court invoked Rule 11 and con-
demned both ghostwritten petitions and ghostwritten schedules of
assets and liabilities. The court mostly speculated about the possi-
bility of problems that could occur, but that did not.143 The court
did, however, enunciate a new potential problem: the occasional
necessity of filing amended schedules where the first filed sched-
ules contained errors or omissions. In a case where the party was
represented by an attorney, this would be done routinely; but a pro
se petitioner might have no notice of the need for amendment. 144
This matter, of course, does not give rise to a Rule 11 problem.
141. Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16178, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 16, 2000).
142. See Ostevoll, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16178, at *31-32. In denying respondent's
motion to strike the pro se pleading, the court found that the filing of a photocopy of
a previously filed pleading, with a new signature page containing the pro se peti-
tioner's signature, was not a Rule 11 violation "and did not result in Petitioner gaining
an unfair advantage over Respondent." But the court noted its confusion regarding
the plaintiff's representation:
[T]he Court has been inundated with faxed letters from Petitioner, his attor-
ney in Norway, and letters from (state local) counsel. Thus, Petitioner, while
claiming to be proceeding pro se, is obviously receiving substantial assistance
from counsel. Petitioner and counsel have failed to heed the admonitions of
the Court with regard to the lack of appearance by counsel on behalf of
Petitioner. Instead of retaining counsel to represent him in this matter and
having counsel enter an appearance, Petitioner simply utilizes local counsel
and his Norwegian attorney, neither of whom is counsel of record, to make
requests on behalf of Petitioner through correspondence while, at the same
time, making it clear that they are not representing Petitioner in the matter
before this Court. We find this conduct troubling. As such, we feel the need
to state unequivocally that this conduct violates the Court's Rules and will
not be tolerated further.
The court also found counsel's "practice of running interference for Petitioner equally
inappropriate." Id. (citations omitted).
143. See In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
144. Id. at 734. The remedy to this problem, of course, is to provide pretrial assis-
tance to pro se petitioners that includes instructions regarding such matters. Interest-
ingly, on the issue of a pro se litigant's awareness of procedures, FED. R. Civ. P.
83(a)(2) provides that "A local rule imposing a requirement of form shall not be en-
forced in a manner that causes a party to lose rights because of a nonwillful failure to
comply with the requirement." The rule was adopted, as explained by the Advisory
Committee to the 1995 amendments, because
Courts rely on multiple directives to control practice, including publication
of the Federal Rules and local rules, as well as "internal operating proce-
dures, standing orders, and other directives." Although such directives con-
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The cases and ethics opinions condemning ghostwriting and in-
voking Rule 11 or similar rules appear to be a product of judges or
attorneys who seek sanctions against pro se litigants. These judges
and attorneys are simply irritated that someone receiving a modest
amount of legal assistance has the audacity to come to court with-
out counsel and believe that he or she can access the justice system.
A close look at Rule 11 and the cases interpreting it reveals that
the rule could conceivably be invoked by counsel or the court
under appropriate circumstances, but provides no justification for a
blanket ban on undisclosed ghostwriting.
Rule 11, after the 1983 amendments, was applicable to "anyone
who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper.' 1 45 According to the
Advisory Committee Notes, however, in the case of "unrepre-
sented parties... the court has sufficient discretion to take account
of the special circumstances that often arise in pro se pleadings. 146
When a party is not represented by counsel, but Rule 11 sanctions
appear appropriate, "the absence of legal advice is an appropriate
factor to be considered.' 1 47 Where a pleading is obviously drafted
tinue to be authorized, they can lead to problems. Counsel or litigants may
be unaware of various directives. In addition, the sheer volume of directives
may impose an unreasonable barrier. For example, it may be difficult to
obtain copies of the directives. Finally, counsel or litigants may be unfairly
sanctioned for failing to comply with a directive. For these reasons, the
amendment to this rule disapproves imposing any sanction or other disad-
vantage on a person for noncompliance with such internal directive, unless
the alleged violator had been furnished actual notice of the requirement in a
particular case.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note on 1995 amendments. The committee
went further and suggested a procedure to avoid the "problems" attendant to the
complexity of litigation, i.e.,
Furnishing litigants with a copy outlining the judge's practices-or attaching
instructions to a notice setting a case for conference or trial-would suffice
to give actual notice, as would an order in a case specifically adopting by
reference a judge's standing order and indicating how copies can be
obtained.
Id. One wonders why, if the court recognized the complexity of the system as a
whole, it did not take the same approach to the federal rules and local rules, which
could be "outlined" for litigants as the committee suggests be done for "internal di-
rectives." Some courts have adopted procedures, particularly for pro se prisoners,
simplifying and providing forms for habeas corpus and civil rights action. Courts have
a duty to inform pro se litigants of basic legal information needed to access the justice
system. Such information should include simplified descriptions of practice and pro-
cedure rules.
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note on 1983 amendments.
146. See id. (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
147. Id. It is well established that pro se litigants are not exempt from Rule 11
sanctions. See also Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1994); Bigalk v. Fed.
Land Bank Ass'n, 107 F.R.D. 210 (D. Minn. 1985). One court has held that pro se
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by the litigant, this liberal standard is appropriate. But ghostwrit-
ten pleadings are, by definition, drafted by an attorney. Does the
court have a means to haul the ghostwriter into court to address an
apparent Rule 11 violation under the stricter standard applicable to
attorneys?
The notes to the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 answers the ques-
tion in the affirmative:
The sanctions should be imposed on the persons-whether at-
torneys, law firms, or parties-who have violated the rule or
who may be determined to be responsible for the violation ....
When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in
order to determine whether the sanctions should be imposed on
such persons, firms, or parties either in addition to or, in unusual
circumstances, instead of the person actually making the repre-
sentation to the court. For example, such an inquiry may be ap-
propriate in cases involving governmental agencies or other
institutional parties that frequently impose substantial restric-
tions on the discretion of individual attorneys employed by it.'4 8
Therefore, in appropriate cases, a ghostwriter attorney may be
hailed into court, under Rule 11 or the inherent power of the court,
and be subject to sanctions. This may be done where a pro se
pleading is obviously ghostwritten and there are reasonable
grounds to believe a Rule 11 violation has occurred. In that event,
the court may compel disclosure of the ghostwriter's identity and
proceed accordingly. Practically speaking, the less stringent stan-
dard that applies to pro se litigants will not apply because the court
will inquire whether the pleading was ghostwritten. If it was, the
standard has no relevance. This answers the questions asked by
the courts that were "wringing their hands" about potential Rule
11 problems. 4 9
Future cases in which ghostwriting is detected should be handled
differently. There is no justification for invoking Rule 11 as a pre-
text for barring ghostwriting and additional consultation with a pro
litigants are held to a more lenient standard than professional counsel, with the rule's
application determined on a sliding scale according to the litigants' level of sophistica-
tion. Horton v. TWA, 169 F.R.D. 11 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
148. Id. (emphasis added). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note on
1993 amendments; Lockary v. Kayfetz, 974 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
court may sanction, under its inherent powers, a non-profit legal corporation which
controlled and paid for litigation).
149. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971); Laremont-Lopez v.
Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1997);
Johnson v. Bd. of County Commr's, 868 F.2d 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994), affd on
other grounds, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996).
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se litigant. Neither should Rule 11 be used to compel disclosure of
the ghostwriter's identity or the terms of the representation agree-
ment, absent a reasonable belief that the rule has been violated. 5 °
2. Appearance and Withdrawal Rules
Two additional grounds for condemning ghostwriting relate to
the questions of who is representing a litigant and whether ghost-
writing constitutes an evasion of the rules governing appearances
and withdrawals. Some of the cases condemning ghostwriting in-
volve the courts' confusion regarding whether a litigant is appear-
ing pro se or by counsel. 151 As far as those courts were concerned,
there were only two choices for litigants: they could represent
themselves in all matters or have an attorney represent them in all
matters.1 52 There was no middle ground for defining an attorney-
client relationship.
The typical pro se litigant likely thinks there is nothing wrong
with getting occasional drafting or counseling assistance from an
attorney. While the client may believe that she remains pro se, the
courts view the matter as an either/or proposition. Pro se litigants
may have difficulty explaining their limited representation arrange-
ment, as courts are not yet accustomed to unbundling.
The question then arises whether representation is equivalent to
an appearance. The manner of entering an appearance is regulated
by local rule.153 Under federal law, litigants are entitled to re-
present themselves or to be represented by counsel. 154 Most courts
require either that an entry of appearance form be filed or that an
150. See CHARLES F. LUCE, UNBUNDLED LEGAL SERVICES: CAN THE UNSEEN
HAND BE SANCTIONED?, at http://www.mgovg.com/ethics/ghostwrl.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002).
While Rule 11 provides that-an attorney's signature is a certification that the
pleading is well-grounded in fact or law, the converse, that the absence of an
attorney's signature is a hallmark of a spurious and frivolous pleading, is
hogwash .... [I]t is no more misleading or deceitful for an attorney to ghost-
write a meritorious pleading than it is proper for an attorney to sign a frivo-
lous and groundless pleading. The real issue is not the presence or absence
of a lawyer's signature, but the intended or reasonably foreseeable effect of
the unseen assistance of counsel.
Id. (emphasis added).
151. See supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MAR-
CUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3154 (2d ed. 1997).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2001) ("In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such
courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.").
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attorney's name appear on the face of the pleading. A court may
prevent an attorney who has entered an appearance from with-
drawing from a pending matter. 5 5 The Thirteenth Amendment,
however, may prohibit a court from compelling an appearance of
an attorney on behalf of a pro se client for purposes of forced rep-
resentation in a civil matter. 56 That is not to say the attorney
could not be hailed into court for purposes of sanctions. If a court
cannot compel an appearance, however, it cannot charge a ghost-
writing and consulting attorney with intentional evasion of with-
drawal rules.
According to Rule 1.16 of the Model Rules, an attorney is re-
quired to withdraw from representation of a "matter" when the
representation will violate the rules of professional conduct or
other law; 157 when the lawyer's physical or mental condition mate-
rially impairs the representation; 15 or when the lawyer is dis-
charged by the client.' 59  Lawyers may withdraw from a
representation only if the withdrawal will have "no material ad-
verse effect on the client's interests.""16 As with the other rules,
except Rule 1.2, which authorizes a limited services agreement, this
rule makes no reference to limited legal service arrangements, nor
does it define the term "matter." Is a "matter" to be equated with
an "appearance" in court? No authorities appear to equate the
two.
Nevertheless, the court in Laremont-Lopez161 condemned the
ghostwriting attorneys who never filed their appearance on
155. See MODEL RULES, supra note 73, at R. 1.16(c) ("When ordered to do so by a
tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for termi-
nating the representation.").
156. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting involuntary servitude).
157. See MODEL RULES, supra note 73, at R. 1.16(a)(1).
158. Id. at R. 1.16(a)(2).
159. Id. at R. 1.16(a)(3).
160. Id. at R. 1.16(b). This paragraph also adds six additional situations where
withdrawal "may" be accomplished, i.e., where (1) "the client persists in a course of
action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal
or fraudulent," R. 1.16(b)(1); (2) "the client has used the lawyer's services to perpe-
trate a crime or fraud," R. 1.16(b)(2); (3) "the client insists upon pursuing an objec-
tive that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent," R. 1.16(b)(3); (4) "the client
fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services
and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obli-
gation is fulfilled," R. 1.16(b)(4); (5) "the representation will result in an unreasona-
ble financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the
client," R. 1.16(b)(5); or (6) where "other good cause for withdrawal exists." R.
1.16(b)(6).
161. Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp.
1075, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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grounds that they violated Local Rule 83.1(G). Local Rule 83.1(G)
provides that "once an attorney has entered an appearance in a
civil or criminal action, withdrawal is permitted only by order of
the court, and after reasonable notice to the party represented.' ' 62
The purpose of the Rule is "to provide for communication between
the litigants and the court, as well as ensuring that the court is able
to fairly and efficiently administer the litigation. ' 163 After conced-
ing that the attorneys never filed an appearance, the court rational-
ized its application of the rule as follows:
While the Attorneys in these cases did not initially enter a for-
mal appearance, they did contract with these plaintiffs to pro-
vide legal representation directly related to the litigation of
these cases. The Attorneys drafted the plaintiffs' pleadings and,
in at least some cases, they were compensated for their efforts.
Had they signed the pleadings, as they should have done, they
would not have been permitted to terminate their representa-
tion without the Court's permission and adequate notice to the
plaintiffs. The Attorneys represented litigants in a federal ac-
tion, and then terminated their representation, without ever for-
mally appearing before the Court. If the Court permitted
Lawyers to provide piecemeal representation to otherwise pro
se litigants without entering an appearance, Local Rule 83.1(G)
would be circumvented. 64
The court went on to explain how this arrangement "may be con-
venient for counsel,' 1 65 but disrupted the court's "efficient admin-
istration of justice. ' 166 The court suggested that, rather than
permitting the client to file a pleading unsigned by the ghostwriter
attorney, the attorney retained only to draft the pleading should
instead sign it and file it simultaneously with a motion to withdraw






167. Id. at 1077 n.2. However, one commentator notes that "the court did not say
whether such a motion would be well-received." JAMES M. MCCAULEY, THE ETHICS
OF MAKING LEGAL SERVICES AFFORDABLE AND MAKING THE LEGAL SYSTEM MORE
ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC 5 (concluding that reexamination of ethics and unautho-
rized practice restrictions is necessary to insure that an appropriate balance is struck
between protecting the public and increasing access to legal services for those who
cannot afford them), http://members.aol.com/jmccauesq/ethics/articles/probono.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2002). One wonders what attorney who has only been paid to
draft a pleading would want to prepare the pleading, appear, prepare a motion to
withdraw and a supporting brief, and hope for the best.
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anomalous decision, finding limited representation regarding a fed-
eral action equivalent to an "appearance," is unprecedented, un-
supported by any legal or ethical authorities,168 and unnecessary.
A simple inquiry regarding the representation arrangement would
have revealed that it was a product of persons of modest means
who could not afford full legal services. The court should not have
charged counsel with "circumventing" the local withdrawal rule
when it was obvious that they were ghostwriting and advising cli-
ents who otherwise would have no representation. 169
In summary, the argument that ghostwriting gives pro se litigants
an undue advantage ignores reality. First, ghostwritten pleadings
are usually of sufficient quality that no liberality of construction is
necessary despite the fact that all pleadings are entitled to a liberal
construction whether filed pro se or not. Second, the practice of
ghostwriting does not constitute a per se violation of Rule 11 be-
cause either the pro se litigant or the ghostwriter is still accounta-
ble for compliance with the rule. Third, given that rules of ethics
permit limited services representation, the court cannot constitu-
tionally compel an attorney to involuntarily enter an appearance
for a client. The practical effect of such a rule would require all
attorneys who draft a pleading and provide substantial or extensive
advise to a client during the course of litigation to file an appear-
ance and represent the client regardless of the terms of their repre-
sentation agreement. This is a result not countenanced by existing
law or procedural or ethics rules, and is not likely to be acceptable
to the bar.
168. See Va. State Bar Ass'n Op. 1129 (1988).
169. See LUCE, supra note 150:
[S]ome legal assistance is preferable to none at all, and if the client is unable
to afford the complete panoply of the attorney's skills, it should not conse-
quently be deprived of all of them. [The Model Rules provide for limited
representation]. This is not simply an issue of indigent representation; many
attorneys could not themselves afford uninsured legal representation. If jus-
tice is to be practically available for all, if the litigation is not to become
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Il. RECENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
A. Conferences and Recommendations
1. Fordham Conference
In December 1998, a conference was held at Fordham University
School of Law entitled "The Delivery of Legal Services to Low-
Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues.' 170 A set of pub-
lished recommendations stemming from the conference partially
address ghostwriting as a form of limited legal service. 171 The con-
ferees noted that "courts have an affirmative obligation to help liti-
gants and advance limited service methodologies which increase
access to the courts.' 1 72 They further noted that "courts and the
legal profession should be encouraged to explore innovative efforts
to assist pro se litigants. 1 73
The conferees created a three-part typology of legal service de-
livery: (1) traditional, "full-service" representation; (2) limited le-
gal assistance; and (3) general advice.'7 The second category
consists of two sub-categories: (1) brief, specific advice and (2) as-
sistance requiring a diagnostic interview. 75 In addition, legal ser-
vices attorneys have the "luxury" of having clients screened for
financial eligibility or to determine whether the matter falls within
170. See Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1774-78 (1999) [hereinafter Recom-
mendations of the Conference].
171. Id. at 1751-1800.
172. Id. at 1777-78.
173. Id. at 1778.
174. Id. at 1775-76.
175. Id. 1776. The Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance, which developed
the relevant recommendations, directed them to "those providing services to low-in-
come people, but did not rule out that these provisions and recommendations could
be applicable in a private practice setting as well." See Report of the Working Group
on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1824-25 (1999) [hereinafter
Report of the Working Group]. In the legal services context, it may be possible to
categorize clients in this bureaucratic fashion, i.e., based on the time and the amount
of paper it takes to deal with their problems. Time is also undoubtedly the primary
factor in the private sector. The private attorney-client relationship, however, is not
so easily categorizeable and is qualitatively different than the legal services attorney-
client relationship. Clients in the private attorney situation may have an initial con-
sultation and then return unexpectedly for additional advice. They may then return
because of some new development in the case and retain the attorney to provide a
limited service such as writing a letter on their behalf. If the matter is not resolved,
full representation may be in order. In other words, the relationship is often contin-
gent on many unknown factors and may continue as long as it is productive (and
affordable to the client). Many attorneys will agree that some cases are never really
"closed," as they must be, for statistical purposes, in a legal services environment.
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the scope of their services, after which they may decline to assist
because of their caseload or other reasons.176 The attorneys may
never see a client again after this screening process because a re-
jected and frustrated client is not likely to return. In the situation
faced by private attorneys, in contrast, clients often keep coming
back for assistance. The categorization of legal assistance cannot
be neatly placed into the three pigeon-holes agreed upon by the
Fordham conferees. These categories may be a useful device for
parsing the attorney's ethical duties, but do little to enhance a cli-
ent's access to justice. "The average litigant is more likely con-
cerned with the success of the pleadings than with the ethical
quandaries of those who may help draft them.' '1 77
When brief, specific advice is sought, the client should be advised
of the limited nature of the services to be provided, and the lawyer
must comply with the duties of confidentiality, competent repre-
sentation, and conflicts avoidance. 178 After limited services have
been rendered, "the lawyer or legal services program has no fur-
ther obligation with respect to this client.' 1 79 In limited services
cases, the lawyer should conduct a "diagnostic interview" to elicit
"sufficient facts to enable an appropriate decision as to the limited
service(s) to offer the client and for the client to make an informed
176. Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 170, at 1776-77.
177. See Raul V. Esquivel, III, The Ability of the Indigent to Access the Legal Pro-
cess in Family Law Matters, 1 Loy. J. PuB. INT. L. 79, 94 (2000).
178. Id. The Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance debated the issue of
whether an attorney-client relationship exists by virtue of the diagnostic interview
that it proposes. Report of the Working Group, supra note 175, at 1828-29. While not
expressly stated, the reference in the report to the general rule that the attorney-client
relationship turns on the client's perception, "regardless of what the lawyer says or
does," indicates a concern regarding the issue of whether they have ethical duties
toward individuals not accepted as clients after the diagnostic interviews:
[W]e ultimately agreed that consumers participating in the diagnostic inter-
view should receive some of the protections that attach with the formation
of the attorney-client relationship. Our approach was to define the underly-
ing objectives of the applicable ethical rules, and then to seek to accomplish
those objectives. We agreed that the competency requirement attaches re-
gardless of whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed. We also
readily agreed that the information obtained during this process should be
kept confidential .... [W]e all agreed that the lawyer should be held ac-
countable for the discrete task that she provides and that it must be per-
formed competently.
Id. at 1.829 (emphasis added). See also infra note 265 (citing two ethics opinions dis-
cussing the rule of confidentiality as it applies to attorneys who consult with clients
but do not accept their cases.)
179. Id.
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decision about how to proceed."18 Nevertheless, there are those
who believe that a "diagnostic interview" is unique to the ghost-
writing situation, and that it is necessary-along with ascertaining
whether the client can "effectively pursue her case" and whether
the forum is "receptive to pro se litigants"-to determine whether
ghostwriting assistance will be a "competent solution to the client's
problem. ' 181 These commentators have uncritically accepted Pro-
fessor McNeal's suggested obligations of a ghostwriter and errone-
ously equated the duty of competent representation with a
competent solution. It is true that attorneys must be competent,
but no ethical duty mandates that attorneys provide "competent
solutions." If that were so, malpractice insurers would be out of
business. This competence includes "knowledge of the circum-
stances under which the recommended course of action might
change and when additional services might be necessary," informa-
tion-like all other information obtained in the interview-that is
to remain confidential.18 2 The need to acknowledge the pro se liti-
180. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 170, at 1777. This "diag-
nostic interview" should "elicit a variety of factors that would assist the provider in
determining the most appropriate choices for [the] client .... For example, the pro-
vider should determine the caller's ability to use pro se materials." Id. If it is learned
that the client is unable to read or write, a legal services agency that offers limited
legal services should not, it is recommended, offer the client the "daily pro se clinic on
how to get your own order of protection," nor should it refer the client to a "website
on how to get an order of protection." Id. The conferees, in promoting the concept of
a "diagnostic interview," are not recommending anything new as far as the attorney-
client relationship. Every competent attorney conducting a client interview should
have as an objective the determination of "the appropriate choices for his client." Id.
One does not have to be a low-income person seeking limited legal services to expect
that from an attorney, whether "brief, specific advice" is sought or more. Anything
less would be a breach of the duty of competence, if not a breach of contract, because
determining the best choices for them is why people go to lawyers in the first place.
The working group was probably aware of the adverse ghostwriting case law de-
scribed above. See supra notes 8-40 and accompanying text. The concept of the diag-
nostic interview was presumably developed to emphasize a ghostwriting attorney's
duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry of the facts and issues of a client's legal problem
as required by rules of professional responsibility, Rule 11 and similar rules, and civil
legal malpractice law, before drafting a pleading to be filed. The working group rec-
ognized a double-edged sword, on the one hand, in responding to the courts' castiga-
tions of ghostwriting attorneys as deliberate evaders of professional ethics and court
rules and threatening contempt citations, and, on the other hand, wanting to make
sure this recommendation does not come back to haunt them in the future by way of
ethical complaints or civil liability. Attorneys cannot avoid potential disciplinary or
civil liability by conducting some form of interview in which no legal information or
advice is conveyed. Client interviews are not merely a one-way transmission of facts,
but are usually a give-and-take of facts and law.
181. See Rothermich, supra note 77, at 2714.
182. Id. On the issue of confidentiality, Professor McNeal writes:
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gant's right to invoke that right of confidentiality as to the fact and
identity of legal counsel, ghostwriter or otherwise, subject to an
exception for cause, is addressed below.18 3 The diagnostic inter-
view was suggested for cases that fall into the middle of the range
between those requiring full representation and those in which
only "brief, specific advice" is given.184
Beyond these, none of the Fordham recommendations refer spe-
cifically to ghostwriting. In a later publication, however, Professor
Mary McNeal, a member of the working group that developed
these recommendations, noted that the application of the recom-
mendations turns on the proposed distinction between brief, spe-
cific advice and services requiring a diagnostic interview.1 85 She
concedes that the distinction "does not lend itself to easy defini-
tion, '186 and that distinguishing between these two forms of legal
services "remains difficult," 87 but explains that ghostwriting falls
within the category of services requiring the proposed diagnostic
interview: 1 8
Once the client chooses ghostwriting from the range of limited
legal assistance options, the lawyer must elicit additional facts to
assist her in drafting the pleadings. The lawyer must utilize at
least the same degree of care she would in the traditional full
service model. Arguably, a higher degree of care is required
here since it will be more difficult for the client proceeding pro
se to rectify any errors or omissions.189
Professional McNeal goes on to make several suggestions re-
garding additional ethical duties of ghostwriting attorneys. 9 ° She
Given that the diagnostic interview will generate detailed information about
the consumer, maintaining confidentiality is even more imperative in this
context than in the "brief, specific advice" setting. Additionally, candor is
particularly important given that a full and honest depiction of the facts is
essential in determining the appropriate range of services .... With respect
to form pleadings, hotlines, ghostwriting, and other forms of discrete task
representation, information obtained during the diagnostic interview and
pursuant to providing the service must be kept confidential.
See Mary Helen McNeal, Responses to the Conference: Having One Oar or Being
Without a Boat, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2636 (1999) [hereinafter Responses to the
Conference].
183. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
184. See Report of the Working Group, supra note 175, at 1826.
185. See McNeal, Responses to the Conference, supra note 182, at 2619.
186. Id. at 2622.
187. Id. at 2647.
188. Id. at 2635.
189. Id. at 2641.
190. See infra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
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concludes with suggestions for future research, including a curious
suggestion to study "what prospective clients or low-income people
in need of legal services want but are not getting from lawyers."'19'
2. National Unbundling Conference
Another set of relevant recommendations emanated from an
October 2000 conference entitled "The Changing Face of Legal
Practice: A National Conference on 'Unbundled' Legal Ser-
vices. "192 The conferees recommended, inter alia, that the court
and bar should adopt rules, regulations, and procedures to permit
unbundled services under appropriate circumstances. 193 According
to the conferees, the ethical parameters of unbundled legal services
need to be critically examined and the current ethical rules should
be revised to increase access to the courts.' 94 Does this mean that
only poor persons are entitled to limited legal services? If limited
legal services include single consultations, preparing contracts, and
other discrete services, this suggestion would put many attorneys
out of work. Whether those who can afford counsel should benefit
from publicly-funded pro se assistance programs is debatable. To
191. See McNeal, Responses to the Conference, supra note 182, at 2644 (footnote
omitted). Some might say this would be a study of the obvious, as full representation
is what all clients want but-if they cannot afford it-cannot get from attorneys.
192. See 26 Recommendations from the Conference, http://www.unbundledlaw.org/
Recommendations/confrecs.htm (last visited September 4, 2001). For some unstated
reason, one of the recommendations emanating from this conference is that "The bar
should encourage the adoption of a word or phrase to better describe this set of ser-
vices, instead of 'unbundling."' Id. at Recommendation 23. No alternative was
suggested.
193. Id.
194. Id. at Recommendation 3.
The bar, court, consumers, and legal services providers (including non-profit,
for profit and 'dot com' legal entrepreneurs) should collaborate to develop,
provide and promote assisted pro se and 'unbundled' services to persons
who cannot obtain legal services to gain effective access to justice. These
systems should be structured to provide the maximum range of services to
low and moderate-income people and to retain core values of the profession.
Id. A comment on the web site publishing these recommendations reflects a belief
that unbundled legal services should only be provided to those unable to afford
counsel:
There may be resistance by the bar and court if this recommendation [rec-
ommendation 3] means providing services for persons who can afford the
services of an attorney, but choose not to do so. Implementation of such a
recommendation should clarify the difference between free services and
those provided for a fee. It should be clear that the "unbundled" legal ser-
vices system is providing help only to people who cannot afford attorneys. If
a person is voluntarily unrepresented then the bar, court and legal services,
should not provide "unbundled" service.
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say that no person who can afford full-service representation
should be able to arrange for limited-scope representation is
untenable.
In addition to recommending that courts establish pro se assis-
tance programs, study the needs of pro se litigants,' 95 and evaluate
various methods to avoid miscarriages of justice, 96 the group di-
rected some recommendations to the private bar. These included
recommendations that the private bar collaboratively consider the
development of models of unbundled legal services; 197 promote un-
bundling and pro se support to bar members through ethics educa-
tion, law practice management training, and model retainer
agreements; 198 establish unbundled services panels recruited,
trained, and sponsored by the bar "on a pro bono, reduced fee, or
sliding scale fees depending on the client's ability to pay";199 and
"experiment" with the use of non-lawyer advocates to provide lim-
ited legal services with the "participation" (notably, not supervi-
sion) of members of the bar by way of "support and assistance. 20 0
Finally, and most relevant, is the recommendation that "The bar
should examine ways to facilitate pro se litigation, such as the de-
velopment of plain English uniform laws and pleadings and permis-
sible ghostwriting. ' 20 1 In addition, "[t]he bar should take steps to
define the ethical perimeters [sic] of unbundling and maintain a
dialogue with those responsible for ethics and discipline by sharing
information, advocating responsible 'unbundled' services and seek-
ing accords on permissible methodologies. ' 20 2 These latter recom-
mendations reflect the chilling effect of the courts' and ethics
panels' negative view of ghostwriting.
3. Kansas State Bar Justice Commission
Several bar associations and public committees have also issued
reports on unbundling and related issues like pro se assistance.
The May 1999 Kansas Justice Commission report concludes-with-
out specifically mentioning ghostwriting-that limited legal ser-
vices "could have substantial benefit for consumers by increasing
195. Id. at Recommendation 8.
196. Id. at Recommendation 9.
197. Id. at Recommendation 15.
198. Id. at Recommendation 16.
199. Id. at Recommendation 17.
200. Id. at Recommendation 18.
201. Id. at Recommendation 22.
202. Id. at Recommendation 21.
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access to legal services. '20 3 The report also recommends that the
state bar "study the extent to which unbundling of legal services
can be accomplished without undermining the lawyer's ethical obli-
gation to the client," and that the state bar recommend that the
supreme court adopt a rule "permitting unbundling in circum-
stances where it is appropriate. 2
0 4
4. Michigan State Bar Committee
In Michigan, a committee of the State Bar's Access to Justice for
All Task Force issued a report in April 2000 wherein they "recog-
nized that the benefits of unbundling are significant for low and
moderate-income clients, their attorneys, and the legal system. 20 5
On the issue of ghostwriting, the committee studied the "three pri-
mary views ... regarding pleading and document preparation": 20 6
that ghostwriting, or "drafting assistance," is (1) ethical and other-
wise acceptable, even without disclosure to the court,20 v (2) unethi-
cal and unacceptable,2 0 8 and (3) acceptable provided there is
disclosure by way of a notice that a pleading was "Prepared by
203. See Kan. Citizens Justice Initiative, Draft Final Report of the Kansas Justice
Commission (May 4, 1999), http://www.kscourts.org/kcji/draft/index.htm.
204. Id. at Recommendation 15. The "Rationale" for this recommendation states
in part that "there are serious ethical issues that must be resolved in determining
whether a new Supreme Court Rule should be adopted . . .[and] the Commission
recommends that this issue be studied further ..... Id. Of interest also is Recom-
mendation 17:
(a) The Kansas Supreme Court should promulgate a policy statement for
the Kansas court system concerning pro se litigants to increase uniformity in
dealing with these litigants by providing guidance to court administrators,
clerks, the bench, the public, and the bar. The statement should specify the
services and types of assistance that may be provided to pro se litigants with-
out violating rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law.
(b) Three pilot projects should be conducted to evaluate the use of pro se
service centers or kiosks to assist pro se litigants. Large, medium-sized and
small counties should be selected for the pilot projects.
(c) The pro se policy statement should require development of an education
program for judges, court staff members, attorney and pro se litigants.
205. See STATE BAR OF MICH. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL TASK FORCE, REPORT
OF THE SERVICE DELIVERY SUBCOMMITTEE WORK GROUP B-UNBUNDLING, 1
(2000), available at http://www.michbar.org/access/sds/unbundling.pdf.
206. Id. at 10.
207. Id. at 10-11.
208. Id. at 11. The report's commentary regarding this position, which is the same
as that taken in the cases and opinions described above-Johnson, Laremont-Lopez,
Wesley, and ABA Informal Ethics Opinion 1414 are cited-warns that "it is of suffi-
cient significance to the bar and judiciary that a recommendation favoring undisclosed
drafting assistance might derail the entire unbundling process." Id.
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Counsel" or signed by the preparer. °9 The Unbundling Work
Group concluded
that low and moderate-income clients in Michigan would be best
served by authorizing a system where full disclosure of attorney
preparation is required. The group also agreed that it is prefera-
ble to require a statement in the form of "Prepared by (attor-
ney's name)," rather than simply stating that the form was
"Prepared by an attorney."210
The committee noted the legitimate concerns of the bench and
bar regarding the ethicality and acceptability of certain forms of
unbundling (read: ghostwriting). Such concerns, according to the
committee, "preclude widespread provision of discrete task repre-
sentation under existing court rules.2 1 The committee recom-
mended a series of steps to promote limited services, including (1)
broad dissemination of its report;212 (2) modification of Michigan
court rules to permitting the filing of ghostwritten pleadings-
which would not constitute an appearance-provided the drafting
attorney or firm is personally identified, 213 and to permit a "limited
appearance" permitting an attorney to withdraw after the client's
limited objectives and means have been met; 214 and (3) miscellane-
ous promotional methods to educate the public, the media, and the
bar about unbundling.2 1 5
209. Id. at 13.
210. Id. at 14. The group also agreed "that attorney assistance with previously pre-
pared self-help forms and/or review of client prepared pro per pleadings should be
excluded from the 'prepared by' disclosure statement on the document." Id.
211. Id. at 15.
212. Id.
213. The proposed rule states:
If a pleading, including a form, has been prepared by an attorney, law firm,
or legal services agency which has not appeared formally in the case, the
pleading shall indicate the name of the attorney, law firm, or legal services
agency that prepared the pleading or form. Such disclosure does not consti-
tute an appearance by the attorney in the proceedings.
Id.
214. Id. at 16. The proposed rule states: "An attorney may, upon written agree-
ment with the attorney's client, enter an appearance limited in objectives and means.
The attorney who has filed a limited appearance may withdraw from the action when
the client's limited objectives, as set forth in the appearance, have been reached." Id.
The commentary explains that "This recommendation would not permit an attorney
to 'withdraw at will' from a court case. Rather, it would require that the attorney: 1)
execute a retainer agreement limiting the scope of representation by establishing spe-
cific objectives and the means to be employed in achieving those objectives, and 2)
withdraw only after achieving the named objectives."
215. Id. at 16.
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5. California State Bar Access to Justice Commission
This draft report, issued in September 2001, supports the expan-
sion of unbundled legal services. 16 Its suggestions, however, run
counter to the positions taken by the previously-discussed courts,
ethics panels, and bar committees.
The recommendations are:
1. Ghostwriting: Work with the Judicial Council to develop a
rule of court that would allow attorneys to assist in the prepara-
tion of pleadings without disclosing that they assisted the litigant
if they are not appearing as attorney of record.2 17
2. Limited Representation Form: Work with the Judicial Coun-
cil to develop forms to be filed with the court clarifying the
scope of representation when the attorney and client have con-
tracted for limited scope legal assistance.218
3. Notice of Withdrawal: Work with the Judicial Council to de-
velop a standard form of Notice of Withdrawal to formalize at-
torney withdrawal and notice at the conclusion of limited scope
legal assistance.219
216. See LTD. REPRESENTATION COMM. OF THE CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUS-
TICE, REPORT ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE WITH INITIAL RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 1 (2001) (on file with author), available at http://www.calbar.org/2bar/3exd/
reports/ubO/unbundlingreport0l.pdf. The report notes how limited legal services
will increase access to the courts and legal assistance because more individu-
als will get some legal assistance in situations where, because of lack of re-
sources, they would receive no legal help if only full services were available.
This practice is also partially consumer driven, as consumers of legal services
insist on, and receive, greater control over their legal matters and
representation.
Id. From the court's standpoint, unbundling
will clarify the presentation of issues and help reduce errors and continu-
ances, demand on court personnel, and court congestion. New procedures
can provide clarity about when a party is or is not represented, helping the
court and opposing parties address such issues as knowing who needs to be
served, and with whom they can negotiate.
Id. From the attorneys' standpoint, unbundling
can provide access to many more potential clients, who can afford some, but
not the entire, traditional model of legal representation .... In addition,
developing solutions and providing guidance for attorneys who offer limited
scope assistance will be a great service, assisting them to avoid malpractice
exposure where they perform ethically and competently; ensuring that their
involvement in a case is limited to what they contract for; and allowing attor-
neys to recover court-sanctioned attorney's fees in limited appearances when
fees would be awarded for the same tasks if performed in a full service
context.
Id.
217. Id. at 6.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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The committee made several key points and studied arguments
in the report. Regarding "preparation of pleadings or other court
documents '22 1 for a pro se litigants, the report found that, while
the practice does present "some potential ethical concerns, "221 con-
trary to the authorities discussed, there is no statute, rule, or case
that requires the attorney to disclose his or her participation to
either the court or the opposing party. Since the party is the one
signing the document, it is the party who is certifying that the
document is not fraudulent, misleading, or otherwise improper
.... Because the party is therefore subject to sanctions for an
improper pleading, it is important that the attorney advise the
client of [the rule prohibiting improper pleading], and the conse-
quences of its violation.222
Attention was also given to questions surrounding the termina-
tion of limited services representation. The committee found that,
in situations going beyond a "brief, one-time event," an attorney
must take care to properly terminate the representation. If no
court appearance is involved, the client must be clearly advised
that the agreed-upon representation has been completed, and
that the attorney is no longer assisting the client. The client
must also be advised of any impending deadlines or other tasks
pending, and any other consequences of the attorney's with-
drawal. Where the limited representation has included court ap-
pearances, the attorney must also take whatever steps are
legally required to assure that he or she is no longer attorney of
record.223
Not surprisingly, the committee concluded that existing "Rules
of Professional Conduct do not preclude the ability of attorneys
and clients to limit the scope of the representation provided. 224
The committee also felt that the ethical duties of maintaining confi-
dences, avoiding conflicts, and assuring competence are just as ap-
plicable to limited services representation as to full service
representation. The committee found that no changes are neces-
sary in the existing Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee
noted, however, the importance of monitoring the work of the
state bar commission established to review the ethical rules "to as-
sure that there are no changes which would restrict-and that there
220. Id. at 10.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 11.
224. Id.
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is consideration of changes that might enhance-the ability of cli-
ents to obtain the services they need."225
The committee also found that limited scope representation ben-
efits the court in several ways. It reduces the number of errors in
documents, limits wasted court time due to pro se procedural mis-
takes, decreases demand upon court staff time, and eases docket
congestion.226 Although litigant focus group respondents reported
they would like
an attorney to argue a motion, evidentiary hearing or trial in
court ... this is an area in which attorneys are often cautious
about providing limited scope services. Lawyers need certainty
that courts will abide by the limitations contained in the retainer
agreement. In general, while a court may have a preference for
an attorney to represent a litigant for the entire case, the court's
desire for more litigants to be represented in court proceedings
can effectively be met by allowing limited scope services.227
As to preparation of pleadings, the judges in the focus groups
conducted by the committee reported that it is generally possible
to determine from a pleading whether an attorney was involved in
the drafting of the document '228 and that "the benefits of having
papers prepared by an attorney are substantial. '229 Private attor-
neys who engage in ghostwriting "revealed that they would be
225. Id.
226. Id. at 12. The report cites comments of judges in focus groups convened by the
committee indicating "a strong interest in assisting self-represented litigants obtain as
much information and assistance from attorneys as possible." Id. This attitude of Cal-
ifornia state judges differs greatly from that expressed by the federal judiciary in the
cases discussed in section IlI.A., supra. This attitudinal difference might be a product
of the caseload differences and institutional constraints to which state court judges are
subject, but federal judges are not. Assuming state court judges have a greater moti-
vation in looking for means to smoothly process their heavier caseload than federal
judges, they may be more hospitable to ghostwritten pleadings because of their obvi-
ous benefit to the court, and they may have less time to develop legal and ethical
grounds for challenging their alleged impropriety. This difference may also account
for the absence of any state cases on the subject of ghostwriting.
227. LTD. REPRESENTATION COMM. OF THE CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE,
REPORT ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE WITH INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
13 (2001). The committee recommends the Judicial Council adopt a form
clarifying that an attorney is making an appearance for a limited issue or for
only one hearing. This would provide notice to the court and the other
party, and ensure a clear understanding between the client and lawyer re-
garding the scope of the service. It would also allow clerks and opposing
counsel to know who was attorney of record and to whom notice should be
sent.
Id.
228. Id. at 14.
229. Id.
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much less willing to provide this service if they had to put their
names on the pleadings. 2 30 According to the report, the court's
present ability to sanction the pro se litigant who signs an im-
proper, ghostwritten pleading, coupled with its ability to refer the
matter for investigation to the State Bar (whether or not disclosure
of the ghostwriter is made on the pleading), is sufficient to address
the problem.z3'
In sum, the reviewed state bar reports reflect the diversity of
views regarding ghostwriting. One (Michigan) permits it, but re-
quires full disclosure of the attorney's identity. One (California)
permits it, without mandatory disclosure, holding ghostwriters to
all pleading and ethics rules. One (Kansas) resolved to study the
issue further.
6. Court Rules Authorizing Limited Legal Services
Colorado232 and Maine233 are the first two states to adopt court
rules that permit limited appearances in litigation on behalf of pro
230. Id.
Issues raised included: increased liability; worry that a judicial officer might
make them appear in court despite a contractual arrangement with the client
limiting the scope of representation; belief that they are helping the client
tell his or her story-and that a client has a right to say things that attorneys
would not include if they were directing the case; fear that the client might
change the pleading between leaving the attorney's office and filing the
pleading in court; apprehension that their reputation might be damaged by a
client's inartful or inappropriate arguing of a motion; concern that they
would be violating the client's right to a confidential relationship with his or
her attorney; [and] worry that they may not be able to verify the accuracy of
all the statements in the pleadings given the short time available with the
client.
Id. at 10-11.
231. LTD. REPRESENTATION COMM. OF THE CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE,
REPORT ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE WITH INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
10-11 (2001). For some reason, the committee also recommended that the Judicial
Council adopt a rule that would specifically allow ghostwriting. The rule would "re-
quire that attorneys providing limited task representation disclose their involvement
only if the litigant is requesting attorney's fees to pay for their services." Id. There is
some authority that a pro se litigant entitled to statutory attorneys' fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act is not entitled to fees incurred for ghostwriting or other
legal services while representing to the court that he is proceeding pro se. See United
States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that "impor-
tant policy considerations militate against validating an arrangement wherein a party
appears pro se while in reality the party is receiving legal assistance from a licensed
attorney," citing the duties of candor to the court, interference with the court's ability
to supervise the content of the pleadings, and the unfair advantage argument).
232. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 11 (2000) (signing of pleadings); COLO. Civ. R. 311
(2000) (signing of pleadings); CoLo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.2(c) (scope and objectives
of representation); CoLo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4.2 (communication with person rep-
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se litigants. Table 1 in the appendix provides a complete overview
of the requirements of each state's set of court and professional
responsibility rules.
The distinctive features of the rules can be summarized as
follows:
1. Both rules234 have a requirement of disclosure to the court
of the fact that a pro se litigant's pleadings or other papers are
drafted by an attorney under a limited representation agree-
ment. Both states require that the attorney ghostwriter be iden-
tified, but only Maine requires that the court be informed of the
scope of the limited representation agreement.
2. Both rules require that limited representation be by agree-
ment between client and attorney, but Maine requires that the
agreement be in writing using the court's proposed form or a
similar form not inconsistent with it.
3. Both rules require that the attorney explain to the client the
benefits and risks of limited representation.
4. Both rules (a) apply the general pleading signature and cer-
tification rules to documents prepared pursuant to a limited rep-
resentation, and (b) permit the ghostwriting attorney to rely on
the client's representation for the facts used as the grounds for
the pleadings drafted, but (c) Colorado requires the attorney to
conduct an independent investigation of the facts whenever
those provided by the client are false or materially insufficient.
Maine permits the nature of the limited services representation
to be a factor in determining the attorney's compliance with the
duty of competent representation.
5. Maine exempts from limited appearances instances in which
(a) a pleading signed by an attorney is filed and (b) pleadings
are filed outside the scope of the limited appearance. Colorado
exempts from limited appearances instances in which (a) an at-
torney signs a filed pleading or (b) appears before a judicial
officer.
resented by counsel); COLO. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4.3 (dealing with unrepresented
person).
233. See ME. R. Civ. P. 5 (service and filing of pleadings and other papers), ME. R.
Civ. P. 11 (signing of pleadings and motions; sanctions), ME. R. Civ. P. 89 (with-
drawal of attorneys; visiting lawyers); MBR 3.4(i) & (j) (commencement and continu-
ation of representation), 3.5(a)(4) (withdrawal from employment), 3.6(a)(2)
(standards of care and judgment), 3.6(f) (communicating with an adverse party).
234. References to the states' "rule" or "rules" on limited appearances and repre-
sentation refer to the set of amendments to the rules of civil procedure and profes-
sional responsibility that each state's supreme court promulgated in order to
recognize attorney-client relationships that involve discrete tasks, rather than full-ser-
vice representation.
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6. Both rules permit direct communications with a pro se liti-
gant by opposing counsel who has knowledge of the limited ap-
pearance or representation.
7. Maine exempts attorneys providing legal advice only in con-
nection with non-profit legal services or court-annexed pro se
assistance programs from strict compliance with duties to con-
duct conflicts checks, unless the attorney has actual knowledge
of a conflict.
8. Maine permits an attorney to withdraw from an action
where (a) a substitute attorney contemporaneously files an ap-
pearance, (b) no motions are pending, and (c) no trial date has
been set. Leave of court is required in all other instances, in-
cluding withdrawal from a limited representation.
9. The Maine rule explicitly cautions that the limited appear-
ance rule has no application to the federal district court, and in
Colorado the federal district itself has so indicated by adminis-
trative order.
These rules are valuable models that other states should consider
if limited representation in litigation is to be realized as a means of
enhancing access to justice. The rules address many ethical con-
cerns of the client, the ghostwriting attorney, opposing counsel,
and the court itself. Experience with limited representation will no
doubt refine these rules further.
B. Proposed Ethical Obligations of Ghostwriters
Commentators have suggested that attorneys offering unbundled
legal services have obligations not previously imposed on attor-
neys. These duties do not exist as to full-service clients, however,
and are unnecessary and counter-productive to the cause of pro-
moting unbundling and increasing access to justice.
1. Duty To Predict Pro Se Client's Future Litigation Success
In her commentary regarding the Fordham recommendations,235
Professor McNeal addresses the duty of competence under Model
Rule 1.1 with respect to ghostwriting:
A lawyer choosing to engage in ghostwriting must competently
assess the client's ability to accomplish her goals with ghostwrit-
ten pleadings. This requires an assessment of the client's ability
to advocate effectively for herself and the receptiveness of the
applicable setting to pro se litigants. If the lawyer concludes
that this particular client is not likely to succeed proceeding pro
235. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
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se with the ghostwritten pleadings, the lawyer should not pre-
pare them for the client.
2 36
This position is problematic for several reasons. First, while at-
torneys have a duty to do their jobs competently under Rule 1.1,
even if full-service representation is provided, there is no ethical
duty to "competently assess" the client's "ability to accomplish her
goals." An attorney-client relationship begins with a dispute in
which the client is involved, and the attorney has no way at the
outset of predicting the dispute's outcome. Many factors affect the
ultimate resolution of a matter. These include the state of the law
on the subject, the facts of the case, the available evidence and
witnesses, and the personality of the judge and opposing counsel.
The lawyer's assessment of the case is based on these and other
factors, and is likely to change as the case progresses. The attorney
does not base a judgment to accept the case based on the "client's
ability to accomplish her goals" because of the multiple factors that
will contribute to the eventual outcome. 37
Professor McNeal explains that the client's "ability to accom-
plish her goals" includes making an assessment of the "capacity" of
the client to proceed pro se.238 She also mentions the "complexity
of the problem," the "seriousness of the particular problem," and
236. See McNeal, Responses to the Conference, supra note 182, at 2640-41 (citation
omitted). Another commentator makes a similar argument in the context of the law-
yer's duty to avoid limitations on the representation that may "be so great as to com-
promise the lawyer's duties" of competent and diligent representation:
Before agreeing to limit the scope of the representation, the lawyer should
determine whether limited representation would be counterproductive. The
lawyer should assess whether the client understands the limited nature of the
representation and whether the client is capable of proceeding pro se. For
example, consider the pro se litigant's educational background and linguistic
skills to determine whether the client is capable of proceeding pro se.
See Grace M. Jones, Ghostbusters, http://www.state.ma.us/obcbbo/ghostbusters.htm
(last visited Nov. 9, 2001). Like Professor McNeal's proposed "likelihood of success"
standard, under the latter standard few pro se clients would be able to purchase and
receive the limited representation they seek. See infra note 240.
237. Professor McNeal describes her proposed "likelihood of success" standard as
follows:
Presumably, the primary goal is to assist legal consumers in obtaining just
resolutions of their legal problems. An alternative approach to that goal is
to focus on the client's "likelihood of success" with the limited legal assis-
tance obtained. One should ask what impediments hinder the client in trans-
lating the limited legal assistance into a successful resolution of the problem.
The nature and extent of these impediments then determine the viability of
appropriate limited legal assistance.
Id. at 2642.
238. Professor McNeal describes the assessment of the capacity of the client to pro-
ceed as including
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the "power dynamic between the parties" as additional factors to
be included in the "quite challenging" assessment to be conducted
by the attorney.239 Apparently, attorneys from whom limited legal
services are sought should only accept the "perfect" pro se client,
one who, in the attorney's judgment, will successfully navigate the
justice system without further assistance. Unfortunately, such pro
se clients do not exist. It is impossible to know whether an individ-
ual will succeed in the litigation, as much depends on court policies,
programs, and the conduct of individual judges and court staff. An
attorney willing to provide drafting assistance will not want to
make the prediction that the pro se client will "succeed" in the
system. Assisting someone who later cannot navigate the system
could give rise to liability against the lawyer who, it could be ar-
gued, negligently breached his duty to predict his pro se client's
"success." Such an assessment is not the primary consideration of
a full-service attorney and should not be the primary consideration
of a ghostwriting attorney. Pro se litigants are entitled to the legal
assistance they can afford in order to pursue their legal actions.
Attorneys, whether private practitioners or legal service attorneys,
should not be gatekeepers, providing access to justice only to those
who can "accomplish their goals" or "advocate effectively" for
themselves. Many attorneys may not be able to "advocate effec-
tively" in someone's judgment, but that does not mean they should
not be allowed to advocate the best that they can on their clients'
behalf. Pro se litigants should not have to pass some attorney's
litmus test of "ability to accomplish her goals" to be entitled to
access the justice system.
Another aspect of the proposed ethical duty of "competently as-
sessing" the client's ability to "accomplish her goals" in deciding
whether to provide ghostwriting services is the need for the attor-
ney to assess "the receptiveness of the applicable setting to pro se
litigants." 40 What could this mean? Professor McNeal says this
refers to "the willingness of the court to apply the law and proce-
dure accurately, to permit unrepresented litigants to raise their
claims, and to expend the necessary resources to resolve issues
the client's literacy, intellectual ability, vulnerability (emotional, financial,
and physical), emotional fortitude and determination. These factors should
be analyzed in conjunction with those defined above, cognizant of the obvi-
ous tension between determining a prospective client's ability to proceed on
her own and paternalism.
Id. at 2643 (citations omitted).
239. Id. at 2643.
240. Id. at 2642.
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fairly. ' 241 Every attorney hopes and assumes a court will apply the
law and procedure correctly. But under this proposal the ghost-
writing attorney now has the added duty of predicting whether one
or more judges in a court may not "apply the law and procedure
accurately" or "permit" the client to raise his or her claims. If so,
should the attorney then deny legal assistance to that client and
deprive them of access to the justice system? Attorneys always
have a view of the likelihood of success in bringing a matter to a
particular forum or judge. If the case has merit, however, they pro-
ceed with it regardless of the potential inhospitability of the forum.
To do otherwise is to abdicate one's responsibility as a lawyer.
Moreover, what if, under the proposal, a lawyer erroneously
predicts the court will not be able to accomplish the client's goals,
or accurately apply the law and procedure, or permit the client to
raise claims? Will not this create a basis for civil liability against
the attorney that made the erroneous assessments?
In sum, Professor McNeal proposes that the attorney in a pro se
case base a decision to ghostwrite on factors not applicable or de-
terminative in the case of a client seeking full service representa-
tion. The proposal has as its primary goal the protection of the
attorney, rather than promotion of an innovative method of legal
service delivery. Under her proposal the attorney would deny lim-
ited representation because the chances are low that the pro se liti-
gant would succeed, and because of the fear that the client would
somehow attribute his or her lack of success to the lawyer. This is a
form of gatekeeping, based purely on self-protection.242
2. Duty to Monitor Pro Se Client's Litigation
Professor McNeal's commentary on the report of the Fordham
Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance states that "if a prob-
lem arises due to the [ghostwriting] lawyer's failure to adequately
investigate" the facts, or is otherwise "due to an omission by the
lawyer, the lawyer should provide and should be obligated to pro-
vide, additional assistance.12 43 If the "difficulty" is not the lawyer's
fault, then
the result should depend on the seriousness of the problem, and
whether or not the client can successfully accomplish her goals
without further legal assistance. A balance should be struck be-
241. Id.
242. Indeed, pro se clients are likely grateful for any legal assistance and are far less
likely to complain about inadequate diligence or competence than full-service clients.
243. Id. at 2641.
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tween a standard so strict that it will discourage lawyers from
providing ghostwriting assistance and one so lenient that it will
potentially harm clients.244
No one would argue with the proposition that lawyers who err in
their representation are obligated to correct the error made
whether the client proceeds pro se or otherwise.245 Professor Mc-
Neal, however, suggests that, even if the pro se client's "difficulty"
is not of the attorney's making, the attorney nevertheless has an
ethical obligation to provide further legal assistance, depending on
the "seriousness" of the problem and the client's ability to "suc-
cessfully accomplish her goals without further legal assistance. '246
She does not indicate whether the attorney under these amorphous
circumstances would be required to provide further legal assistance
for a fee or pro bono.
No authority compels the attorney to "rescue" a client for whom
ghostwriting services have been provided, but who has met "diffi-
culties" that are not the fault of the attorney.247 It would certainly
244. Id.
245. In one anti-ghostwriting article, an attorney argues that
The attorney who drafts a complaint on behalf of a party but allows the
party to prosecute the complaint is at risk of a [malpractice] claim should the
party's action result in failure .... [T]hus an unsuccessful result can be laid
at the doorstep of the attorney who has crafted the initiating complaint or
taken an unseen role in its prosecution.
See PAUL A. SINCLAIR, GHOST STORIES: THE UNSEEN LAWYER, (arguing that ghost-
writing is properly sanctionable by court action and bar disciplinary proceedings),
http://www.nornbook.com/HB Fal198/fal198_ghost.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2001).
The possibility of a malpractice claim is always present, regardless of the extent of
legal services provided. This goes with the territory of practicing law and should not
be a deterrent to assisting pro se litigants.
246. Forrest Mosten himself made a surprisingly similar proposal in answer to the
oft-heard concern that clients contracting for limited representation "will believe that
the coach is doing everything a lawyer needs to do," and then "may not monitor
deadlines, or ... show up for a hearing":
The attorney needs to check from time to time to ensure that the client's
strategy is sound, and this should always include the client's monitoring of
deadlines. It should also include the client's understanding of when it would
be appropriate to ask for more help.
See Mosten & Borden, supra note 5. Once legal services have been provided to a full-
service client and the representation has ended, there is no further legal or ethical
obligation to monitor anything. Why should the situation be different where only
limited services are provided? An argument can be made that if such a duty to moni-
tor post-representation events exists, it is equally appropriate in the full-service
context.
247. One commentator suggests that
simply drafting pleadings may not be enough to allow people true access to
justice. Forcing people to be frustrated does not make them feel empow-
ered. It only furthers their suffering, . . .[but ghostwriting] does address a
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be a good deed for the attorney to offer such further assistance, but
it is not an ethical or legal duty. That is the nature of limited repre-
sentation. Unless the services involve consultation throughout the
litigation, the end to the attorney-client relationship usually occurs
earlier than the conclusion of the legal matter. There is no require-
ment of further services beyond those contracted for, assuming the
client's interests have not been materially affected by the with-
drawal as Model Rule 1.16(b) requires.248 Most people would
agree that pro se litigants' right of access to the court must be im-
plemented by court-annexed programs. It is the duty of the court
to assist the pro se litigant in accessing the justice system. If courts
are not doing that, we need to encourage them to do so, and to
avoid chilling the willingness of some attorneys to provide such ser-
vices through threat of procedural or ethical rule violations. Pro-
posals such as Professor McNeals' are protection overkill.
IV. RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE FACT AND IDENTITY
OF LEGAL COUNSEL
We have seen how limited representation rules have been fash-
ioned by two states2 49 to address the concerns of the federal courts
that have "vehemently condemned ' 250 ghostwriting. Under these
rules, the solution to the problem of the purported "undue advan-
tage" that ghostwritten pleadings give pro se litigants, and the al-
leged breaches of ethical duties and procedural rules by the
attorneys who draft such pleadings, is to compel the litigant to dis-
close the fact and identity of their attorney.251 While such a rem-
edy might comfort the court and opposing counsel, such that an
"unseen hand" is not "controlling" the litigation, no serious consid-
eration has been given to the issue of a litigant's right of confidenti-
mode of providing low-cost legal services to those litigants who have sophis-
tication to make their own way through the system.
See SILAS HARRINGTON, ARTICLE REVIEW (reviewing Rothermich, Ethical Implica-
tions, supra note 77), http://www.wcbcourses.com/wcb/schools/LEXIS/law/ln800574/6/
files/harrington.rev.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2001).
248. Cf. Nicols v. Keller, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1672, 1684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
that an attorney who provides limited representation has the duty to inform the client
of legal problems which are reasonably apparent, even though they fall outside the
scope of retention; the limitations of the attorney's representation; the possible need
for other counsel; and the array of legal remedies available).
249. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
250. See Rothermich, Ethical Implications, supra note 77, at 2704.
251. In Oregon, pro se pleadings must be accompanied by a certification disclosing
whether the litigants selected the document and completed without assistance, or
whether they paid anyone to assist them in preparing the document. See ORE. UNIF.
TR. CT. R. 2.010(7).
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ality with respect to this information. There are many reasons why
clients might choose not to disclose the fact that they received or
are receiving legal assistance, and from whom. The law and ethical
principles entitle them to keep such information confidential.252
Scenarios in which an attorney and client might agree to keep their
relationship co fidential include: (1) where an attorney is a friend
of both the pro se litigant and his divorcing spouse or other adver-
sary in a civil dispute; (2) where the attorney may not want the
adverse publicity from public knowledge that he represents a par-
ticularly unpopular pro se client; (3) where the pro se client knows
that the judge in the case and his ghostwriting attorney do not have
a good relationship, and he does not want the disclosure to ad-
versely affect his case; (4) where the attorney who provides ghost-
writing services because he is sympathetic to pro se litigants seeks
to avoid ostracism for that service by members of his bar associa-
tion or judges with anti-pro se attitudes; (5) where the attorney
wants to assist the pro se client, but does not want to get involved
in the matter because opposing counsel is particularly uncivil or a
user of hardball tactics that he fears will lengthen the litigation
needlessly; (6) where the attorney knows his client will not have
the funds to litigate the case fully and he wants to avoid being
forced to stay in the case by a judge who may decide that, once he
appears, his withdrawal motion should be denied; (7) where the
attorney is employed by a private company or non-profit organiza-
tion and wants to assist a pro se friend in a legal matter, but does
not want his employer to know that he is representing the pro se
litigant on his own time; or (8) where the attorney may not desire
to appear before the assigned judge because of a problem with him
in the past, he knows that if he appears and files a notice of substi-
tution of judge the other side will do the same thing, and the third
judge may be worse than the first, so-given the client's ability to
pay-ghostwriting and coaching the litigant may be in the client's
best interest.
Perhaps most pro se litigants would not object to disclosing the
fact and identity of their attorney. Some clients, however, "may
prefer nondisclosure for strategic reasons or to avoid exacerbating
252. The right to maintain the confidentiality of the fact of counsel, or the identity
of counsel, can be viewed not only as a legal privilege, but as a corollary to the right to
control one's own litigation, which has its source in adversary theory, history, and
tradition. STEPHEN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DE-
FENSE 10, 24 (1984).
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the conflict. 'z5 3 Even if this is the case, the court can compel dis-
closure of the lawyer's identity where limited service includes an
appearance in certain stages of the litigation and counsel's identity
is of necessity disclosed. But, absent cause or an actual court ap-
pearance, the right of confidentiality may be invoked by litigants
who object to these disclosures. A related concern is the com-
pelled disclosure of the nature of the limited representation agree-
ment itself, as required by Rule 11(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure, which regulates limited appearances.254
A. Duty of Confidentiality
American lawyers have a duty of confidentiality255 that protects
against compelled disclosure. The principle of confidentiality is
given effect in two related bodies of law: the attorney-client privi-
lege in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality estab-
lished in professional ethics.2 56 Specifically, Rule 1.6 provides, in
relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents after consultation, ex-
cept for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the law-
yer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) [disclosure of clients' criminal acts]; or
(2) [disclosure relating to attorney-client litigation, and civil
and criminal defense of the lawyer], or to respond to allega-
tions in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client.
The commentary to the rule states in part that "A fundamental
principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer main-
tain confidentiality of information relating to the representation.
The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly
with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging sub-
253. Prochnau, supra note 5.
254. M. R. Civ. P. 11(a), which requires that a limited appearance "shall state pre-
cisely the scope of the limited representation," could be interpreted narrowly to mean
that the court is entitled to know in what stages of the litigation the attorney will be
involved.
255. See ABA CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 6 (1908); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1969); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5
(1998).
256. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1969).
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ject matter. '257 A question that immediately comes to mind is
whether compelled disclosure of the fact or identity of counsel
would not only chill clients' ability to communicate fully and
frankly with the lawyer, but also the client's desire to see an attor-
ney at all. One can conceive of many situations in which a client
may not wish to make the fact that they have consulted legal coun-
sel publicly known, or, if they have, the identity of that attorney. I
think most people would agree that compelled disclosure of the
fact or identity of legal counsel would not be tolerated in the non-
litigation setting.
The questions is whether the fact and identity of counsel are
matters that constitute "information relating to the representa-
tion '258 and thus are protected from disclosure under Rule 1.6. If
so, would there be an exception to the principle of confidentiality
for parties in litigation due to administrative necessity such as the
court's need to supervise its caseload? The commentary to Rule
1.6 specifically states that "The attorney-client privilege applies in
judicial and other proceedings. ' 259 The privilege is, of course, in-
voked by the attorney who is asked to disclose confidential infor-
mation relating to the representation. It may have no application
to the ghostwriting disclosure question where the client is being
asked to divulge what the client seeks to keep confidential.
Neither the commentary to Model Rule 1.6 nor any other part of
the Model Rules refer to this disclosure question. The commentary
indicates that the confidentiality rule is subject to "limited excep-
tions. '261 The recognized exceptions deal with the attorney's dis-
closure of a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct, the existence of
a substantial threat to someone's safety, or other disclosures that
are adverse to the client's interest.261 The issue in ghostwriting is
whether the client can maintain the confidentiality of the fact and
identity of their lawyer. Conceivably, there could be an instance in
which an anti-ghostwriting court notices that many pro se pleadings
are artfully crafted and learns that a certain local attorney is a
"known" ghostwriter. The court then may decide to inquire of the
attorney who his or her clients are so that sanctions can be imposed
under the case law discussed previously. Would the attorney have
to disclose the identities of his or her clients?
257. Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 4.
258. Id. at R. 1.6 (a).
259. Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 5.
260. Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 9.
261. Id. at R. 1.6 cmts. 9, 15.
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Absent alleged violations of court rules or other improprieties
on the part of the client, probably not, "if there is a reasonable
prospect that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of
the client or if the client has instructed the lawyer not to use or
disclose such information.
262
Even in the absence of a reasonable prospect of risk of harm to
a client, use or disclosure is also prohibited if the affected client
instructs the lawyer ... not to use or disclose information. Such
direction is the client's definition of the client's interests . . .
which controls .... However, client limitations on a lawyer's
authority do not alter a lawyer's obligation under § 63 [regard-
ing using or disclosing client information when required by law
or court order].263
Of course the court's position may be that ghostwriting per se, is
a violation of the procedural and ethical rules and constitutes an
unfair advantage to the opposing side. This may constitute suffi-
cient cause to compel an attorney or a client to disclose the fact of
legal representation and the identities of the attorney and client.
Hopefully, some of the above arguments will persuade courts to
find that disclosure can only be compelled where there is a real and
not speculative rule violation, breach of ethics, or other litigation-
related impropriety, or where counsel personally appears to advo-
cate on the client's behalf.
Absent specific alleged improprieties, may the court justify com-
pelled disclosure of the fact and identity of counsel due to supervi-
sory or administrative necessity? Where there arise "conflicts
between protection of confidential information and other values,"
the Restatement Governing Lawyers indicates that
The broad prohibition against divulging confidential client infor-
mation comes at a cost to both lawyers and society. Lawyers
262. RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 (2000). "In all representation, the
relevant inquiry is whether a lawyer of reasonable caution, considering only the cli-
ent's objectives, would regard use or disclosure in the circumstances as creating an
unreasonable risk of adverse effect either to those objectives or to other interests of
the client." Id. at cmt. c(i). The term "adverse effects" includes "personal embarrass-
ment that could be caused to a person of normal susceptibility and a normal interest in
privacy." Id. (emphasis added).
263. Id. at cmt. c(ii). See also id. at Reporter's Notes cmt. c(ii) (noting that "'infor-
mation relating to representation of a client' [under MODEL RULES, supra note 73, at
R. 1.6(a)] ... includes a fortiori information that the client expressly instructed the
lawyer to keep confidential"); In re Pressley, 628 A.2d 927 (Vt. 1993) (disciplining
attorney for violating client instruction not to disclose to husband's lawyer client's
suspicion that husband was sexually abusing daughter until client had gathered addi-
tional evidence").
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sometimes learn information that cannot be disclosed because
of the rule of confidentiality but that would be highly useful to
other persons. Those may include persons whose personal
plight and character are much more sympathetic than those of
the lawyer's client or who could accomplish great public good or
avoid great public detriment if the information were disclosed.
Moreover, the free-speech interests of lawyers is impinged by a
broad rule of confidentiality. Nonetheless, despite those costs,
the confidentiality rule reflects a considered judgment that high
net social value justifies it. It is recognized that the rule better
protects legitimate client expectations about communications to
their lawyers and that permitting divulgence would be inconsis-
tent with the goal of furthering the lawful objectives of
clients.2 64
The latter indicates that public institutional needs do not over-
ride the rule of confidentiality. There is also some ethics authority
that an attorney may resist state agency-mandated disclosure of the
names of clients with whom he has a consultation, but whose repre-
sentation he does not accept.2 65
But what if a court rule, such as the limited representation rules
of Colorado or Maine,266 requires disclosure of the fact or identity
of the ghostwriting or coaching counsel? Until challenged, they
constitute a specific legal requirement of disclosure and the duty to
maintain confidentiality is "superseded when the law specifically
requires such use or disclosure. "267 Notwithstanding the legal re-
quirement, an attorney in that situation (1) may disclose the re-
264. RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. b (2000).
265. See Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 90-1 (1990) (finding that a legal services organiza-
tion cannot be compelled to name for the state labor department those unemploy-
ment claimants who were consulted-but whose representation they rejected-as part
of complying with the agency's procedure for compensating it for legal services pro-
vided to the claimants, such compliance constituting a breach of a client "confidence"
or "secret" under Ill. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a)). In its opinion, the committee noted
that "the [in]convenience of such process cannot be placed above the need to pre-
serve the attorney's obligation of confidentiality as to what we deem to be secrets of
persons who consult with the attorney." Id. The panel cited its previous Opinion 565
(1977) in support, in which the committee was faced with the similar question whether
a lawyer or legal services organization should honor the state public aid agency's re-
quest for personal information about persons receiving legal assistance from a pub-
licly-funded program, which was being collected to determine eligibility for funding.
The committee ruled that the attorneys and organizations should not honor the
agency's client information requests without the client's consent, because to do so
might serve as an embarrassment to the client or be otherwise prejudicial, despite the
possibility of inconvenience to the state agency.
266. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
267. RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS § 63 cmt. a. "In such situations, steps
by the lawyer to assert a privilege would not be appropriate and are not required." Id.
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quired information only "after the lawyer takes reasonably
appropriate steps to assert that the information is privileged or oth-
erwise protected against disclosure, 268 and in fact (2) has a duty to
object "when a nonfrivolous argument ... can be made that the
law does not require the lawyer to disclose such information. 2 69
Such a challenge will surely be made to the limited representation
rules of Colorado and Maine.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
According to the attorney-client privilege, neither client nor at-
torney may be required "to testify or otherwise to provide evi-
dence that reveals the contents of confidential communications
between client and lawyer in the course of seeking or rendering
legal advice or other legal assistance. '270 The privilege may be in-
voked with respect to "(1) a communication, (2) made between
privileged persons, (3) in confidence, (4) for the purpose of ob-
taining or providing legal assistance for the client. 2 71 The client
has "the primary authority to determine whether to assert the priv-
ilege . . . or waive it."272
There are three assumptions that underlie the rule of confidenti-
ality and the attorney-client privilege. First, "vindicating rights and
complying with obligations under the law and under modern legal
processes are matters often too complex and uncertain for a person
untrained in the law, so that clients need to consult lawyers. "273
Second, "a client who consults a lawyer needs to disclose all of the
facts to the lawyer and must be able to receive in return communi-
cations from the lawyer reflecting those facts ... [otherwise] ade-
quate legal assistance cannot be realized. ' 274 This is because
"Lawyers are much better situated than nonlawyers to appreciate
the effect of legal rules and to identify facts that determine whether
a legal rule is applicable. '275 Third, "clients would be unwilling to
disclose personal, embarrassing, or unpleasant facts unless they
Interestingly, the Model Rules contain no required-by-law exception to the rule of
confidentiality.
268. Id. § 63.
269. Id. at cmt. b.
270. Id.
271. Id. § 68.
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could be assured that neither they nor their lawyers could be called
later to testify to the communication. 276
The privilege "provides a zone of privacy within which a client
may more effectively exercise the full autonomy that the law and
legal institutions allow. ' 277 The rule "is not subject to ad hoc ex-
ceptions 2 78 where "extreme need can be shown for admitting evi-
dence of attorney-client communications. 2 79 These principles
suggest that, where clients instruct their attorneys to keep the exis-
tence of their relationship confidential, or they-as part of their
representation agreement-agree that this be done, the attorney
responding to any blanket legal requirement that such information
be disclosed for all litigants receiving drafting or coaching assis-
tance must first assert the privilege or challenge the legality of the
rule, or both.
There is some authority that the attorney-client privilege does
not ordinarily apply to the identity of the client, the fact that the
client consulted the lawyer, and the general subject matter of the
consultation. Testimony about such matters
normally does not reveal the content of communications from
the client. However, admissibility of such testimony should be
based on the extent to which it reveals the content of a privi-
leged communication. The privilege applies if the testimony di-
rectly or by reasonable inference would reveal the content of a
confidential communication.28 °
However, if the identity of the client, the fact of representation,
and the "general subject matter of the consultation" is not nor-
mally privileged, does it become privileged if the client directs it to
be so, or attorney and client agree that it will remain confidential?
According to the Restatement, the answer is in the affirmative:
276. Id.
277. RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c.
278. Id.
279. Id. "[A] case-by-case balancing approach would exact a high price of uncer-
tainty, possibly frustrating the purpose of the privilege of inducing frank communica-
tion .... The overwhelming weight of authority states or assumes that the privilege is
absolute." Id. Reporter's Note cmt. c.
280. Id. § 69 cmt. g. The "communication" protected by the privilege is defined as
"any expression through which a privileged person ... undertakes to convey informa-
tion to another privileged person and any document or other record revealing such an
expression." Id. § 69. Even under the decisions exempting the identity of the client,
the fact of consultation, and the general nature thereof from the privilege, "inquiry
must be phrased carefully to avoid intrusion on privileged communications." Id. § 69
Reporter's Note cmt. g.
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A communication is in confidence within the meaning of § 68 if,
at the time and in the circumstances of the communication, the
communicating person reasonably believes that no one will
learn the contents of the communication except a privileged per-
son... or another person With whom communications are pro-
tected under a similar privilege.2 8'
Insufficient attention has been given to the issue of confidential-
ity as it relates to mandatory disclosure requirements of court and
bar rules authorizing limited appearances and representation.
Under the aforementioned principles the fact and identity of legal
counsel may in an appropriate case constitute a confidential "com-
munication" under the rule of confidentiality and the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. Absent cause or a personal appearance to advocate
for a client, disclosure under rules authorizing limited appearances
or representation would be impermissible and subject to
challenge.282
281. Id. § 71.
282. See also id. § 59 cmt. c ("Information acquired during the representation or
before or after the representation is confidential so long as it is not generally known
... and relates to the representation"). My position on this issue is not a novel one.
See Clarke A. Alpert, Editorial Opposing Lawyers' Assistance to Pro Se Litigants Is
Off the Mark, 153 N. J. L. J., Aug. 31, 1998, at 833. This letter-to-the-editor questions
a previous editorial [153 N. J. L. J., July 20, 1998, at 253] suggesting that lawyers
should avoid any involvement with unbundling generally, and in particular the draft-
ing of papers filed pro se. The author disagrees with the suggestion on grounds that
(1) a pro se party may need confidential assistance in connection with a litigation
matter for a large number of reasons and "is fully entitled to the benefit of the attor-
ney-client privilege in terms of dealing with those whom he has consulted or the de-
tails thereof," (2) the attorney "should have every right to assist a pro se party as little
or as much as the pro se party needs, without having to cross the threshold and insist
upon being full-fledged counsel of record" because the cost of full representation
means the client "will eschew legal assistance altogether if that is his only choice," (3)
"the attorney may not get involved at all if that [full] level of investment of the attor-
ney's time and analysis is his or her only option," (4) there is no benefit to such a
"draconian rule" to ban ghostwriting, and (5) "it would be cruel to pro se parties with
potentially limited resources, to narrow their choices to (1) full representation by an
attorney, with the huge investment that entails, or (2) no legal assistance at all:"
A suggestion that the attorney "must" sign any documents in which he has
had any participation, even though that participation has been expressly re-
quested by the client to be confidential and/or limited, is heavy-handed and
extremely overbroad. It also does not address the "evil" highlighted in your
editorial and in the Laremont-Lopez case you cite. If a pro se party can
achieve undue advantages by utilizing ghostwritten pleadings, one solution is
to mandate that such a party disclose whether or not he/she has received
assistance, and a general description of the extent thereof, so that the court
can decide how much to bend the rules. This at least would preserve some
measure of confidentiality-and not deter attorneys from helping pro se
parties.
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V. UNDERSTANDING BENCH AND BAR RESISTANCE
Some legal assistance is better than none. Some pro se parties
may benefit from the limited legal services they can afford, which
may only be drafting or "coaching" assistance. Drafting assistance
is the central task in many legal and administrative proceedings,
the remainder being presentation of evidence at a hearing. An in-
creasing number of pro se litigants believe they can rely on their
own judgment for much of their litigation, including their own trial.
Nevertheless, they feel the need to get a good start by filing a
proper pleading and getting other information and advice along the
way. Given these premises, why has the case law condemned
ghostwriting, and why have most judges and bar ethics panels un-
critically accepted those opinions?
Judges and lawyers are naturally conservative with respect to re-
form of the traditional adversary system. Pro se litigation is partic-
ularly annoying to the bench and bar because it upsets the
adversary system's assumption that both parties are represented by
competent counsel, which makes for greater efficiencies in the sys-
tem. We can expect ghostwriting to increase in relation to future
increases in pro se litigation. As pro se pleadings drafted with at-
torney assistance increase in frequency and pro se litigants receive
assistance responding to dispositive motions or other matters, op-
posing counsel lose their traditional advantage over such litigants
by virtue of their specialized legal and procedural knowledge. The
playing field is made more level.
This is possibly what motivated counsel in the cases discussed to
respond by moving for sanctions and fees, putting the pro se on the
defensive and pressuring the assisting attorney to drop the matter
or face the wrath of the court or disciplinary committee. This is all
the more easy to accomplish when one enlists the aid of the court,
by persuading it that limited legal assistance of a certain nature or
quantity (i.e., "extensive" or "substantial") is suddenly no longer
Indeed, I submit that there is no real "problem" to remedy. If paperwork
filed in court by a pro se party looks good enough to the court to have been
done by an attorney, then either an attorney was involved or the pro se party
is skilled enough not to warrant the sort of "special treatment" that might
otherwise be extended to pro se parties.
Having the party proceed with no legal guidance at all harms the system.
Moreover, eliminating all confidential help by an attorney to a pro se party,
simply in order to solve the problem of how much deference to give such
parties, is totally "off point." At best, such an approach represents massive
overkill on an issue that no one appears to have analyzed with respect to the
above issues.
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entitled to confidentiality, but evidences deliberate evasion of pro-
cedural rules and the violation of ethical rules concerning candor
to the tribunal and opposing party. It is time for this segment of
the bar to stop criticizing their brethren, who have no illegal or
unethical intent, and who simply want to offer limited legal services
to those who seek it. If lawyers lose some of their advantage over
pro se litigants because of ghostwriting and coaching, that increases
access to justice, and the complaining attorneys must accept this
new reality.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The ghostwriting case law reviewed earlier does not reflect any
harmful effects to the administration of justice from ghostwriting,
except for occasional confusion regarding whether a pro se litigant
is represented or not, and for what purpose.28 3 There will no doubt
be occasions when counsel's identity will need to be disclosed.
Some form of regulation of limited appearances is, therefore, nec-
essary, and the policy on the subject should contain the following
elements:
1. A recognition of the pro se litigant's general right of confi-
dentiality regarding the fact and identity of legal counsel, sub-
ject to disclosure for cause or when an attorney personally
appears to advocate on behalf of the client.
2. A by-a-preponderance burden of proof upon the party com-
plaining of a pro se litigant's undue advantage from ghostwriting
of proving specific harm or undue disadvantage. Such finding
should be a condition for the entry of any order relating to the
identity of the ghostwriter, the services he or she provides, ter-
mination of preferences in treatment the pro se litigant would
otherwise receive, or any other relevant issue.
3. The principle that a pro se litigant who has limited legal as-
sistance is still entitled to be treated as a pro se litigant for all
purposes not in the control of his attorney under a limited repre-
sentation. In other words, pro se litigants who are fortunate to
be able to afford limited legal services should not be punished
for receiving drafting assistance (or failing to voluntarily dis-
close it) by being denied whatever liberality in treatment they
may be entitled to under the circumstances.
4. An express statement in Rule 11-like pleading rules that the
requirements of the rule apply equally to persons drafting or
assisting in the drafting of all pleadings and papers, or who oth-
erwise direct the litigation.
283. See supra notes 8-49 and accompanying text.
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5. A permissible limited appearance for attorney representa-
tion for discrete litigation matters, with notices to withdraw be-
ing permitted without leave of court when the representation
objectives and means have been met, provided neither the cli-
ent's nor the court's interests are adversely and materially
affected.
6. Permit any degree of limited legal assistance agreed upon by
the parties (eliminating the distinction between "brief, specific"
and "extensive or "substantial" legal services) without there
arising new ethical duties (such as to conduct a "diagnostic in-
terview," to predict the pro se client's "likelihood of success," or
to monitor the client's litigation after termination of the repre-
sentation) imposed on attorneys offering limited legal services
that are not also imposed on all attorneys.
CONCLUSION
Courts and bar ethics committees have condemned ghostwriting
and other forms of extensive or substantial assistance to pro se liti-
gants during the course of their litigation. Nevertheless, the bene-
fits of the practices are obvious. They enhance pro se litigants'
access to justice through the preparation of pro se pleadings that
are less likely to be found insufficient in fact or law, and the prepa-
ration and instruction of pro se litigants regarding various stages of
the litigation. This avoids expenditure of the courts' time or that of
its staff for such purpose, and generally assists citizens to achieve
the goal of a meaningful hearing. To provide such service is to
meet the needs of those who cannot afford full legal representation
and are not eligible for legal aid. Until now, attorneys offering
such assistance have been wrongfully accused of deliberate evasion
of procedural and ethical rules, rather than being commended for
providing innovative legal services to a population that otherwise
would have no legal assistance.
To discourage ghostwriting by mandatory disclosure without
cause of the fact and identity of the ghostwriter or coaching attor-
ney violates the clients' right of confidentiality as to information
about their representation. It also forces a Hobson's choice upon
clients who do not wish to disclose such confidences: go to nonlaw-
yer practitioners, computer software, or the internet, with the ques-
tionable legal competency and accuracy they provide or get no
legal assistance at all. The institutional interests of the court in as-
certaining whether a party is represented and for what purpose is
served by formulating limited representation rules. Such rules
should permit attorneys providing limited legal services to freely
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enter an appearance and withdraw per their limited representation
agreement, subject to existing ethical requirements that this be
done without adversely affecting clients' material interests and
only with adequate notice to the court and opposing counsel.
Moreover, existing rules, such as Rule 11, are adequate to further
the interests of the parties and the court in prohibiting groundless
or otherwise improper pleading, because their reach extends to
those providing drafting assistance without entering an
appearance.
Unrestricted or minimally restricted ghostwriting and coaching
of pro se litigants is not, however, a panacea for the needs of this
population.284 Courts themselves have to adapt their roles, proce-
dures, and protocols to ensure that access to justice is not limited to
those who are so poor they are eligible for legal services or those
wealthy enough to afford full-service legal representation.
284. See Marcus J. Lock, Comment: Increasing Access to Justice: Expanding the
Role of Nonlawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Coloradans, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 461 (noting that limited legal services "does not, by itself, go
far enough to ensure adequate access to legal services for Colorado's indigent").
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
Comparison of Features of Colorado and Maine
Limited Representation Rules*
FEATURE COLORADO MAINE
Permits limited representation Colo. R. Civ. P. 1.2(c) Me. R. Civ. P. 11(b)
& 11(b) Me. Bar R. 3.4(i)
Disclosure requirement
Fact of limited representation Colo. R. Civ. P. 1.2(c) Me. R. Cov. P.
11(b)
Me. Bar R. 3.4(i)
Scope of representation None Me. R. Civ. P. 11(a)
agreement
Attorney's identity Colo. R. Civ. P. 11(b) Me. R. Civ. P. 11(a)
CCR 311(b)
Exception for assistance with CCR 311(b) None
court forms
Requires advice to client re: CRPC 1.2(c) Notes Me. Bar R. 3.4(i)
benefits & risks of limited and 4.2 Notes
representation CCR 311(b)
Requires written limited None2 85  Me. Bar R. 3.4(i)
28 6
representation agreement
Permits reliance on client- Colo. R. Civ. P. 11(b) Me. Bar R.
presented facts CCR 311(b) 3.6(a)(2)
285. While a limited representation agreement is required, there is no explicit
requirement that it be in writing. CRPC 1.2(c) Notes. The Notes state that "The
objectives or scope of services provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement
with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available."
The notes also provide examples, e.g., where "a retainer may be for a specifically
defined purpose"; where representation is from a legal aid agency and "may be
subject to limitations on the types of cases the agency handles"; or where an attorney
is retained to represent an insured and "the representation may be limited to matters
related to the insurance coverage." The Notes indicate that limited retainer
agreements must not require the client to (1) agree to a representation "so limited in
scope as to violate Rule 1.1" (requiring competence in representation), or (2) to
surrender the right to terminate the attorney, or (3) "the a right to settle litigation
that the attorney may wish to continue."
286. "In situations where the lawyer will not be providing limited representation in
court, the limited representation agreement need not be in writing, but must be
reasonable under the circumstances . . . . The reasons a written memorializing
agreement is not required in all contexts include (by way of example) the problem
non-profit and court annexed legal services programs face in securing such a writing
from their clients, and the time entering into the agreement takes in proportion to the
time consumed by the limited representation itself. Nevertheless, to the extent a
writing may be obtained, it is a better practice to do so for both the lawyer and the
client." Me. Bar R. 3.4(i).
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
FEATURE COLORADO MAINE
Incorporates pleadings rules into CRPC 4.2 Notes Me. Bar R. 3.6(f)
ghostwritten papers
Requires independent Colo. R. Civ. P. 11(b) None
investigation if client facts are CCR 311(b)
false or materially insufficient
Exception for signed pleadings None287  Me. Bar R. 3.4(i)
Exception for representation Colo. R. Civ. P. 11(b) None
before judicial officer CCR 311(b)
Exception for filing a pleading None Me. R. Civ. P. 11(b)
outside scope of limited
representation
Permits opposing counsel to CRPC 4.2 & Notes Me. Bar R. 3.6(f)
communicate directly with pro se
litigant who has limited
representation agreement
Permits limited nature of None Me. Bar R. 3.4(i) &
representation to be a factor in 3.6(a)(2)
determining competency
Exempts attorneys in legal None Me. Bar R. 3.4(j) 28 8
services & pro se assistance
programs from conflicts duties
287. While not explicitly stating that an attorney providing limited representation
who signs a pleading (other than in the form of a limited representation notice under
Colo. R. Civ. P. 11(b) or CCR 311(b)) thereby enters an appearance, Colo. R. Civ. P.
11(a), incorporated by reference in CCR 311(a), states that "Every pleading of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name" and "constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
imposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation."
288. "A lawyer who, under the auspices of a non-profit organization or a court-
annexed program, provides limited representation to a client without expectation of
either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation
in the matter is subject to the requirements of Rules 3.4(a)-(e) only if the lawyer
knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest." Me. Bar R.
3.4().
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
FEATURE COLORADO MAINE
Permits withdrawal without leave None MRCP 89(a)
of court (1) where substitute Me. Bar R.
attorney appears, (2) no motions 3.5(a)(4)
pending, and (3) no trial date set
Limits rule to state court None28 9  Me. Bar R. 3.40)
proceedings __ _
*References in each cell are to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure for Courts of Record
(Colo. R. Civ. P.), Colorado Rules of County Court Civil Procedure (CCR), and Colorado
Rules of Professional Conduct (CRPC) (available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/rules/
1999_pdf) (last visited December 23, 2001), and Maine Rules of Civil Procedure (MRCP)
(available at http://www.courts.state.me.us/whatsnew/amndmrcivp.5%2cll%2c89.html) (last
visited December 23, 2001) and Maine Bar Rules (Me. Bar R.) (available at http://www.courts.
state.me.us/whatsnew/amndmebarrules.html) (last visited December 23, 2001).
289. There is no explicit reference to the rule's application or non-application to
the federal forum in Colorado. However, the U.S. District Court for Colorado issued
Administrative Order 1999-6, which states that, despite enactment of the rules
permitting limited representation, "[t]hese changes are not consistent with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 and are also inconsistent with the view of the judges of this court" and "are
not applicable in this court."
